Why we chose this book
Mahan provides a definitive treatise the on the nature of naval warfare, but also makes the case that it is decisive in determining the history of nations. In so doing, he also provides the first great strategic vision of American global power. Mahan still dominates American strategy, even though his name is rarely remembered by the statesmen who follow his advice.
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Mahan
The importance of Mahan is not really the decisive battle anymore. Navies are too large and too spread out for there to be a decisive engagement of fleet; there simply isn't enough time in wars nowadays for such gatherings to occur. They would get annihilated by land-based aircraft. What is important in Mahan is the case he makes for the true purpose of seapower--that you seek the decisive battle so that you may then stop the enemy's commerce.
Of course, the difficulty nowadays is that ships can be constructed so quickly, it's hard to know (unlike in the 19th, and really 18th centuries) when any given sea battle is actually decisive.
Mahan and WWII
Hi
I haven't read this book but from what I've gathered from books on WWI and WWII regarding his theory of the 'decisive battle' that determines the course of a war is incorrect.
Jutland, although a huge battle, was not decisive in a military sense, i.e. the British still maintained their blockade.
Japan and the US both planned for the 'decisive battle' in WWII, it was prominent in the US Plan Orange. I remember reading in Ronald Spector's excellent book Eagle Against The Sun about a Japanese Admiral (I don't remember his name) who told the Imperial Navy to junk its decisive battle plan and prepare for a protracted air/amphibious campaign. He may have also warned them about preparing for anti-submarine warfare for protection of supply convoys, I can't remember. The war for the first two years was a battle of attrition, which ground down the Imperial Navy (especially their experienced and well trained pilots and it reduced training time for sailors because of the increasing lack of oil), so by the time of the big battles during the landings in the Philippines, their fleet carriers were simply bait. The big battleships of the Imperial Navy, designed for the 'decisive battle', couldn't even destroy Taffy 3, a group of escort carriers and destroyer escorts, in the battle off Samar (an incredible story of improvisation under fire).
So again, I haven't read this book, but his theory of the decisive naval battle, doesn't stand up. IMHO
>Jutland, although a huge
>Jutland, although a huge battle, was not decisive in a military sense, i.e. the British still maintained their blockade.
In that, it WAS decisive.
The Japanese reading of Mahan made decisive battle the focus of naval warfare. Actually Mahan was about sea-control - fleet-in-being rather than commerce warfare, which, he theorized, yielded control of the sea to the opponent. Decisive battle is a tool in the sea-control toolbox, it is not in itself a sufficent condition.
At the end of the day after Jutland the RN was still manning the blockade. Germany's situation had not changed, and the Kreigsmarine did not come out again in fleet strength. The decisive battle went the British way. they maintained sea-control.
Mahan, and "Scott," are correct
I agree with Scott's view, but add that you might want to read the follow-on book to Sir Creasy's book "20 Decisive Battles of History" that names "Midway" as one of the few great and decisive battle ever fought. In it, the US Navy ended the Japanese Empires attempt to create the "Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" and spelled their doom. The continued attacks on their military and commercial fleets where the death blows that helped, along with actions by Marine, Army and Allied forces helped to again prove that naval power was, can be, and is decisive to all who would be actors on the world stage.
In recent history, the arrival of the USS Bainbridge sent, followed by the arrival of the LHD4 Boxer MEU {Marine Expeditionary Unit} can be seen as a message to the Somali pirates that things are NOT Business-as-usual any more. Furthermore, from the April 8 U.S. Naval Update Map, it appears that if they start feeling a bit too big for their britches, CVN-69 Dwight D. Eisenhower could send it's air wing to supplement the Marine Harriers and forces at Diego Garcia.
Think economics and logistics
Don’t just read from a tactics and strategy standpoint but with view toward how sea power , or a lack of it impacts the logistics necessary to put the strategy and tactics into play and even more importantly how it impacts a country economy and exert geopolitical power.
decisive battle??
You can bet that Saddam wished he had the ability to contest U.S. sea control with or without a _decisive battle_. The successful American battle plans would not have been possible without sea control both in G.W. 1 and G.W. 2.
With the exception of 2 or 3 countries every nation with ocean frontage has already lost it's decisive battle with the U.S. Navy. With the help of its allies, America can field a five hundred ship fleet. Almost all the countries that have navies are lucky if they can muster a dozen. And that's not even counting the second largest navy in the world which is the U.S. naval reserve.
America has the ability to mass a supply fleet of whatever size when and where they want. They can dispatch that fleet with overwhelming defensive escort to wherever they want and leave it there for as long as they want.