Summer Offensive
The conquest of Iraq has created an interesting dynamic in the war. Both sides are now under pressure to launch summer offensives. Al Qaeda must demonstrate its continued viability. The United States must exploit the victory in Iraq and disrupt al Qaeda operations globally. This indicates to us that both sides will carry out intense operations over the next few months.
If we look at the world through al Qaeda's eyes, the period since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has consisted of a series of significant reversals. First, a U.S. offensive dislodged the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Second, the hoped-for insurrection among the Islamic masses did not materialize. The primary goal of the Sept. 11 assault -- to prompt a rising in the Muslim world designed to create an Islamic regime in at least one country, to serve as al Qaeda's anchor -- did not take place. Finally, Iraq was occupied. The Baathist regime was no friend of al Qaeda, except in the sense that the two shared an enemy. Nevertheless, it appears in the Islamic world that al Qaeda has cost Iraq its freedom.
In short, al Qaeda has little to show for Sept. 11 except significant losses and failure. If this trend continues, as we argued in our second-quarter forecast, al Qaeda will begin an irreversible disintegration process, with support personnel concluding that the organization has ceased to be operational and therefore beginning to fall away. It is insufficient for al Qaeda's network to assert operational capability; it must demonstrate this capability. Thus, during the past quarter al Qaeda has conducted operations in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and possibly in Chechnya. Al Qaeda networks also have been disrupted in Southeast Asia and Africa. The last few months were not decisive; while they demonstrated that al Qaeda still was functional, they did not demonstrate that the organization remained fully effective.
Al Qaeda's challenge in the next few months will be intensified over time -- we are moving toward the second anniversary of Sept. 11. Al Qaeda has developed an operational model in which it launches major attacks about once every two years. The organization's supporters could rationalize that the dearth of major attacks over the past two years dealt more with operational tempo than disruptions in the network. That excuse is going away soon: Al Qaeda must demonstrate its ability to launch a single major operation or, alternatively, a substantial cluster of secondary operations.
While al Qaeda is under pressure to attack, the United States is under the same pressure, deriving from a very different cause. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was not an end in itself: It was designed to set the stage for follow-on operations that would shatter al Qaeda's infrastructure -- both by direct assaults on al Qaeda and, indirectly, by pressuring regimes that have not sufficiently controlled al Qaeda supporters. With that stage now set, the primary value of the Iraq campaign will be Washington's ability to rapidly exploit the advantage it has gained.
It follows from this, of course, that al Qaeda and its allies must undermine the U.S. victory in Iraq. The current guerrilla war has its origins in the Baathist desire to engage, attrite and defeat the United States, but Islamists outside Iraq who have an interest in limiting Washington's ability to exploit its victory are supporting it directly. The guerrilla war serves a number of functions, one of the most important of which is to tie down U.S. forces and limit the bandwidth of U.S. command so it cannot effectively exploit the Iraq victory.
As happens in war, therefore, events have combined to create a sort of swirling engagement -- this time on a global scale. The United States is attacking al Qaeda along multiple axes, and the group is counterattacking. Each side has critical advantages, and the outcome is unclear. Therefore, to gain conceptual control over the operation, the United States -- with far greater resources and therefore far greater opportunities for conceptual confusion -- must build a system of theaters for organizing and managing the war. This already has been done; now is the time that the organization is being implemented operationally.
U.S. operational theaters can be divided this way:
1. Homeland: U.S. intelligence services appear to be moving from surveillance to disruption mode. Both modes are necessary. In the surveillance mode, the primary goal is to trace relationships to map the full extent of the network. In the disruption mode, security services attack the network -- either because they are confident they have mapped its full extent, or because they feel the risk of passive surveillance is too high. There are two risks to be balanced: If the network is assaulted too early, large segments might be left untouched; but if the surveillance continues for too long, the network might be able to attack in spite of surveillance. There is no science to this, and the art generates many gray hairs since an error either way could be disastrous. The exogenous factor driving decisions is the perception of the imminence of attacks -- the greater the perception of imminence, the greater the pressure to move from the intelligence mode to the police mode and make arrests. Recent actions, including the public arrest of an Ohio truck driver, indicate that an offensive against known networks in the United States is under way. Washington is shutting down known and suspected networks to disrupt an al Qaeda offensive.
2. Afghan-Pakistan Theater: U.S. and allied forces continue to come under attack in Afghanistan, despite the fact that they have been playing a relatively passive role. There does not seem to be a plan to launch a major counteroffensive against groups within Afghanistan, but an offensive clearly is under way along the country's border with Pakistan, in the north. The goal apparently is to repeat the events of the winter 2001-2002 offensive in Afghanistan: attack, disperse and disrupt al Qaeda command and control facilities that appear to have redeployed to the remote regions along the border. The offensive has been under way for a while, but it clearly will intensify, which was one of the themes of the Musharraf-Bush summit earlier this week. For Washington, the capture or death of Osama bin Laden is a desirable end, but not the principal end. The principal end is to destroy al Qaeda's strategic command while undermining tactical and operational capabilities in the United States.
3. Africa: Last week, a B-52 bomber on a training mission dropped munitions that accidentally killed a U.S. Marine and wounded several others near Djibouti. It struck us as interesting that forces in Djibouti, which normally would be training for fairly low-intensity conflict, would have been conducting exercises with B-52s -- an expensive endeavor that is unlikely to be undertaken without reason. The task force at Djibouti is responsible for the Horn of Africa region as well as operations deeper in Africa. The United States clearly has intense concerns over Kenya, where it issued a major alert and closed its embassy for several days last week. There also are indications of concern about al Qaeda in Sudan. One example: A ship laden with explosives was captured recently by Greek special forces. The ship was traced to Northern Ireland, and Sudan claimed ownership of the explosives on board. There have been concerns about al Qaeda using Sudan as a base of operations in the past, rendering the ownership of the munitions particularly interesting. A group of al Qaeda operatives were captured in Malawi earlier this week and have been transferred to U.S. control. Meanwhile, U.S. President George W. Bush will travel to Africa in early July, with visits planned to Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria. The visit to Uganda is particularly interesting, since it is strategically placed in relation to al Qaeda's area of operations. In our view, a campaign against al Qaeda is intensifying in Africa and will become more visible over the summer.
4. Iraq region: U.S. and British forces are under attack throughout Iraq. If disorganized mobs are doing the attacking, then so much the worse, since it is more difficult to shut down a disorganized operation. However, our view is that there is a substantial degree of control over many of the operations against U.S. forces, and Washington is under pressure to deal with the situation. Reconstruction and development are more difficult in an insecure environment, and persistent attacks on pipelines will undermine the U.S. ability to underwrite costs through the sale of oil. Perhaps more important, the perception that the United States is incapable of bringing operations in the region under control will undermine Washington's ability to exert pressure on Iran and Syria, and to maintain the current relationship with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, U.S. officials are under substantial pressure to manage the insurrection more effectively -- and that will mean a summer offensive.
There are other areas, such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, that are highly relevant, but where the United States might not launch intense offensives -- either because the threat hasn't matured, the networks are already disrupted or due to resource constraints. What is clear is that the summer will bring overt and covert operations for the United States in multiple theaters of operation worldwide.
It also means that if the United States makes headway, al Qaeda will have to come to life. First, if the United States is effective, it will have to protect itself. Second, if the United States is effective, al Qaeda will face a use-it-or-lose-it situation. If its assets are being rolled up, there is little incentive for the network to continue to patiently preserve those assets. It is paradoxical, but in the short run, the more effective the U.S. operation is, the greater the danger from al Qaeda becomes. Finally, al Qaeda itself is under pressure due to its own circumstances to demonstrate that it remains capable. A recent videotape and communiqué from al Qaeda's head of training both assert that an offensive is in the offing. On the whole, we think that is true.
The bottom line is that both sides in the war -- al Qaeda and the United States -- are looking at this summer and fall as critical periods. The United States must make some decisive inroads against both al Qaeda and the regimes that do not control its members. Al Qaeda must demonstrate that, in spite of U.S. pressure, it remains a viable organization. This demonstration could involve a series of smaller-scale operations -- as in Saudi Arabia -- or a major Sept. 11-level operation in the United States. But it seems to us that both sides need to make a move soon, and we are therefore looking for a summer offensive that stretches into fall. It will be an intense, complex and dangerous period.
