The Spy in the Pentagon
By George Friedman
Late Friday night, the FBI leaked to the media that an Israeli mole had been caught within the Office of Special Plans (OSP), an analytic and intelligence team inside the Defense Department. Within hours, the suspected mole was identified as Lawrence Franklin, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst seconded to OSP, and a specialist in Iranian affairs. According to the leaks, Franklin had passed classified information to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is a powerful lobbying group on behalf of Israel. In addition, it was made clear that Franklin had been under investigation for a year because he had had extensive contacts with the Iranians and had -- in some way -- provided Israel with information concerning U.S.-Iranian intelligence.
The fact that Israel is spying on the United States is not surprising. Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. naval analyst, passed highly classified information to Israel in the 1980s and remains in prison today. Israel, like all other allies, will spy on the United States. That is the way the game of nations is played. In Israel's case, espionage activities are circumscribed by two realities: The first is the perception that Israel is a dependency of the United States whose survival depends on American good will, and therefore that this is a radically unequal relationship. In this view, Israel spying on the United States is particularly egregious because Israel is indebted to the United States.
The second reason this sort of espionage is so sensitive is because of the perception that the United States pursues a pro-Israeli policy that is not in its own interest, and that it does so because of the strength of the Israeli lobby in Washington, a lobby personified by AIPAC. To put it more bluntly: The view is that there is a powerful Jewish lobby that uses its power and influence to shape U.S. Middle Eastern policy in directions that are in the interest of the Israelis, but not of the United States. The inclusion of AIPAC in the Franklin story is particularly important because it lays the groundwork for the claim that AIPAC -- in addition to being a powerful lobbying group -- is also an arm of Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence service.
If Franklin is a spy for Israel, two issues rarely expressed in polite company -- but frequently discussed privately -- come to the surface. The first is that Israel, in spite of being the beneficiary of U.S. largesse, is acting to harm the United States by conducting espionage against it. The second is that Jews in the United States are distorting U.S. foreign policy in order to support the interests of Israel. This then becomes a case of ingratitude coupled with disloyalty.
Where this particularly drives itself home is with what have come to be called "neo-conservatives." Many have tried to explain U.S. behavior in Iraq and other places by pointing to the influence of a number of foreign policy intellectuals who have helped shape U.S. strategy. Led by Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and his aide Douglas Feith, these men are less "neo" than Jewish. When critics, particularly in the Arab world, speak of "neo-conservatives," what they mean in fact is "Jews." In their view, U.S. policy in the Islamic world has not been a response to Sept. 11, but rather an attempt by these Jews to use Sept. 11 to further the interests of Israel. In their view, but for the Jews in the administration who have influenced U.S. President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, there would have been a very different response to Sept. 11.
Given all of this, the charges by the FBI have immediate and enormous effect. Franklin was identified immediately as someone linked to Wolfowitz and Feith. If Franklin was an Israeli spy, then the charge quietly leveled in Washington -- and not quietly in the Islamic world -- that the Israelis had taken control of U.S. foreign policy, would have enormous power and could reshape the landscape of Washington. Therefore, whether the charges are true or not really matters. And whether anyone other than Franklin was involved, directly or indirectly, matters even more. Shaping a framework for thinking about this affair is therefore critical.
The Reality of Spying
To begin with, there is no question that Israel carries out espionage in the United States. It would be irresponsible if it did not. All American allies conduct espionage in the United States, and the United States spies on its allies. The British once said that nations have no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. The relationship with the United States is critical for Israel. It must know what is going on. At the same time, if its agents are arrested, they should expect severe punishment. People who argue that Pollard should be released because he was spying for a friend miss the point. Spying for friends carries greater -- not lesser -- punishments than spying for enemies. Israelis and Jews, distressed that Pollard paid a higher price than Soviet agents who were caught, also miss the point: When an enemy does you harm, he has made no bones about anything but that he is your enemy. When your friend does you harm, there is a greater level of deceit. There is no need to parse this any further. Israel will spy on the United States -- and will get hammered when it is caught.
Israel also will try to influence U.S. foreign policy. Everyone does that, and in a nation of immigrants there is hardly a nation that does not to try it. The greatest example of this was Britain in 1940; when isolated by Germany, it desperately tried to get the Americans to come into the war on its side. The British set up a massive propaganda campaign -- that frequently disseminated false information on the state of the war -- designed to sway public opinion. It depended heavily on wealthy Americans of British descent, making the argument that a joint civilization was at risk. There is nothing new in this. Friendship societies were sending "Bundles to Britain" at the same time German-Americans were hammering home isolationist themes. It's the way the game is played.
Using ethnic groups to influence U.S. foreign policy is nothing new and it was the WASPs, not the Jews, who mastered it. There are two key issues: First, is the policy being advocated in the interests of the United States. Friends of Britain wanted a U.S. intervention on behalf of Britain in 1940. In retrospect, this was in the interest of the United States -- but it was far from clear at the time. But whether policies being advocated by American Jews are in the interest of the United States is as complicated a matter.
But there is another aspect to the issue. It is one thing to influence the government. It is another thing to plant an agent inside the government. This is not as obvious as it sounds. There were many British sympathizers in the U.S. government who secretly collaborated with Britain before Dec. 7, 1941 -- including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who would appear to have broken the law on several occasions in order to help the British. In the same sense, there are many Israeli sympathizers -- many Jews and many not -- inside the U.S. government. The laws concerning a government official releasing classified documents to Israel are a complex issue. There are formal intelligence sharing channels and in practice they are almost always used -- with exceptions. It is always an issue who can transfer classified documents to another power.
The critical questions are: First, was Franklin -- and whoever else was involved -- acting on behalf of American interests or on behalf of Israel? Did he think that he was giving the documents -- if he did give documents -- to the Israelis because it would benefit the United States to do so or in spite of harm it would do? And was he authorized by superiors to make the transfer? The second question is easier: Did he have a formal relationship with Israeli intelligence that superceded his oath to the United States? Did he take money? Did he take orders?
The problem here -- if the reports are to be believed -- is that the documents were not provided to an Israeli official. They were provided to American citizens working for AIPAC who, we would assume, had no clearances for that information. That means the problem is not Franklin alone, but the idea that AIPAC was serving not only as a lobbying group but also as a conduit of intelligence to a foreign government. If that was the channel, then those individuals at AIPAC are in serious trouble, as is AIPAC. That is where an unambiguous line was crossed.
The Problem of the Leaks
All the leaks point to that. The problem we have at this point is all the leaks. Obviously, someone wants the world to know that an investigation is going on. If it is the FBI, it is because there isn't much to the investigation and they are hoping to shake the tree. If it is someone else leaking, it could be an effort to abort the investigation. In either case, the interesting question is the motive behind the leaks. This is not a great way to close an espionage case, to say the least.
In order to make any sense out of this, we need to realize that there is something deeper and murkier in this case: Iran. The United States, Israel and Iran have had a complex relationship for decades. Under the Shah of Iran, Israel and the United States were the foundations of U.S policy in the region. Iran blocked Soviet advances toward the Persian Gulf. Israel tied down Syrian forces that might otherwise be deployed against a key ally, Turkey, while protecting Jordan. There was a close relationship, on every level, between the three countries.
This did not end with the rise of the regime of Ayatollah Khomeni. The tripartite alliance was based on a number of things, none more important than a fear of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Each of the three countries wanted to see Hussein contained and destroyed. Iran was afraid of another war; Israel was afraid of its nuclear weapons; the United States wanted to end the threat Hussein posed to the south. After Sept. 11, the same three-part alliance remained in place, with a new energy and -- from the standpoint of Israel and Iran -- a new set of possibilities.
Prior to Sept. 11, the United States continued to conduct ineffective military operations against Iraq and there was little the other two could do. After Sept. 11, both Iran and Israel saw an opening. The United States could be induced to destroy the Iraqi regime once and for all. From Israel's point of view, this would bring the United States into the heart of the Middle East and, whatever happened, deepen the relationship with the Israelis, while simultaneously eliminating a serous threat. From the Iran's point of view, the U.S. invasion of Iraq would open the door to securing its western frontier and, in the event of a quagmire for the United States, open the way for extracting major concessions from the United States in exchange for support in Iraq.
The issue for Israel and Iran was how to get the Americans involved. In their minds, the key was to feed the United States intelligence indicating that Iraq represented a major threat to the United States. The channel for this was Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, and someone with intimate ties with two camps. First, he was close to the Iranians. Second, he was close to the Jordanians and -- via the Jordanians -- to the Israelis. If what Chalabi was saying was true, then the invasion of Iraq was a necessary step.
Israel and Iran didn't have to collaborate to deliver this message. Chalabi was an equal opportunity conduit: He delivered Iranian as well as Israeli intelligence to Washington. The Israelis had other channels into Washington. Apart from working groups with the CIA and FBI, where there are formal intelligence sharing arrangements, the Israelis could also pump intelligence into the Defense Department via OSP. And it follows that the nexus for this information flow would be the man who was directly assigned to Iran.
Here it becomes murky. In the world of intelligence, as in business, you pay for what you get. The currency in this business is intelligence. You get intelligence, you give intelligence. Highly classified information flows from the United States to friendly and antagonistic countries around the world. There is never a day when some highly classified document doesn't find itself to another country in exchange for what it gives the United States. The Iranians had to ask for a quid pro quo for their intelligence on Iraq, otherwise, it would never have been taken seriously. In that sense, the fact that Chalabi delivered classified intelligence to Iran is not by itself meaningful. The question is who authorized it.
Authorization of informal intelligence swapping is a really complicated matter. It takes place on the street level and it takes place at the presidential level. It is never really clear who has the right to exchange documents and under what circumstances. The Iranian situation is particularly murky because of the informality of the relationship. The Israeli relationship is clearer because there is a formal structure for intelligence sharing. The United States needs everything Israel can give it on Islamist groups. In return, it gives Israel intelligence. The CIA is supposed to manage this relationship, but in the highly charged world of pre-Iraq Washington, trust in the CIA was not high. There is no question but that there were unofficial channels of intelligence sharing.
The critical question on the Franklin affair comes in two parts: First, was Franklin authorized by his superiors to pass information on to the Israelis in exchange for some back channel, unofficial transfer of information? Second, if he was authorized, where did that authorization come from and how did it fit into the formal structure of U.S.-Israeli intelligence sharing? Was this espionage or a decision by senior Defense Department officials to create a new intelligence-sharing system?
None of this would have come to light except for the fact that in April, U.S.-Iranian relations collapsed. The entire structure that had been created -- via Chalabi, his deputy and the Israelis -- fell apart. In addition, it was discovered that the intelligence given to the United States by Chalabi on weapons of mass destruction was untrue. As U.S.-Iranian relations unraveled, Chalabi was re-evaluated. The CIA won the argument they had with OSP over Chalabi's nature. OSP, which was well aware of Chalabi's complex ties, could no longer defend Chalabi based on quality of intelligence. The entire OSP operation came apart as the CIA systematically counterattacked. For the CIA, the back channels were utterly unacceptable. They violated basic rules that the U.S. intelligence community worked by, which were that the exchange of intelligence between the United States and Israel had to go through accepted channels -- and that information provided to Iran had to go through the CIA's even more rigorous policies. The probe of who mismanaged Chalabi has turned into a probe of his managers -- OSP. Franklin, who worked for OSP in both an analytic and operational capacity, probably did pass classified documents to the Israelis and most likely did use AIPAC not only as a conduit, but also as a tool for battling the CIA in Congress.
The fundamental issue here is not whether the Defense Department ran an alternative intelligence shop. There is no question they did. Nor is there any question that they entered into intelligence sharing beyond the CIA's back. They certainly did. But that is not a criminal matter. The issue on the table is whether Franklin went beyond instructions given him by his superiors at the Department of Defense and whether he did it because he was a paid Israeli agent. That would be fairly straightforward.
If this is simply a single agent working for Israel, it is explosive but contained. If it is a matter of Defense Department officials trading in classified material with Israel, that is manageable if it can be demonstrated that the operation was authorized at the highest levels. If it wasn't -- if it originated in OSP without any higher clearance -- it gets explosive big time. There will first be the charge that OSP was completely out of control, with tremendous implications since it was so influential. There will also be the obvious point that it was Jews channeling classified material to the Israelis. That will inevitably raise the question of loyalties. If it includes AIPAC, then the entire issue of the Jewish lobby's role will explode into the middle of the presidential campaign.
Our best guess is that this has much more to do with the CIA's battle for turf against the Department of Defense than it has to do with ethnicity, and that we are seeing an extension of the battle over who screwed up on Iraq. It is moving from the Iranians to the Israelis, but it all comes down to the fact that OSP's analytic product trumped the CIA's. The way the story was leaked indicates less of an investigation and more of a Washington catfight. If AIPAC is caught acting as an intermediary with Israel for classified documents, it doesn't matter how this started. But at the moment, that is still a huge if.
