Saudi Arabia: Al Qaeda's Strategic Goals
STRATFOR accurately predicted in October 2002 that a war in Saudi Arabia would erupt between al Qaeda and the ruling House of Saud. That war is under way. Al Qaeda's tactics have become all too clear, with killings and kidnappings of Westerners having become a common event.
Al Qaeda's strategic goals are, however, more obscure. Saudi Arabia is the golden egg. Economically, politically, religiously and socially, it is a perfect fit for al Qaeda's orientation and ambitions. The kingdom is rich beyond belief -- capable of influencing global oil supplies and, by extension, global politics; it is religiously and socially Wahhabi, fiercely and independently tribal. It is the spiritual heartland of al Qaeda itself.
Al Qaeda's endgame is simple: complete control of the oil-rich kingdom. It hopes to establish a transnational empire. At the heart of this pan-Islamic Ummah (nation) would be Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, and the world's top oil exporter. This pan-Islamic state -- with the Arabian Peninsula as the seat of sovereign authority -- would serve as both the political and the religious leader of the Islamic world.
Based in what is now called Saudi Arabia and with the ability to influence global energy supplies, al Qaeda would have the tools to shape the political and security environments of dozens of other states. It would also have a sanctuary where it could establish and train conventional armed forces while maintaining its cadres of militants.
The United States would never permit an al Qaeda government to come to power in the kingdom. The militant leadership knows this and is not likely to put forward its own government -- at least not directly. Instead, it will look to position leaders among the kingdom's tribal sheikhs, business elite and senior military officers -- as well as some members of the ruling House of Saud -- who are sympathetic to al Qaeda's worldview and willing to support al Qaeda's long-term goal.
The Fight for Legitimacy
To achieve this end, al Qaeda must first weaken its opponents in the government. There are several shorter-term goals for undercutting the House of Saud.
Severing the link with Washington will restrict the Saudi government's foreign policy options, reducing its ability to resist outside interference from nations like Israel or Iran, as well as nonstate actors. When Washington loses confidence in the Saudi government, it will ratchet up its already intense pressure on Riyadh to cooperate in the war against terrorism. The hundreds of concessions and special privileges Saudis enjoy in the United States would come to a grinding halt.
A loss of Saudi political prerogatives -- both at home and abroad -- would be a humiliating loss of face for the royal tribe and would resonate throughout the kingdom, in turn reducing Saudi citizens' confidence in and support for the royal family. Loss of confidence in the royal family's ability and right to rule directly challenges its legitimacy. Al Qaeda has openly criticized the regime's political and religious credentials, labeling it corrupt and hypocritical.
There is an emerging concern about the royal family's ability to rule. The current political turmoil, fueled by the constant attacks on Westerners and bombings of residential compounds, raises fears of political chaos. Islamic political thought traditionally emphasizes that a bad ruler is preferable to fitna (political chaos). Al Qaeda is now perhaps hoping to create just enough political chaos to show that a bad ruler cannot prevent fitna.
A second attack on the regime's credentials centers around its religious legitimacy. Osama bin Laden enjoys broad support inside the kingdom, especially among the deeply pious. Many of his followers are thought to be from Qassim, the base of many prominent Wahhabi clerics. The country's most senior religious leader, Grand Mufti Abdel Aziz Al Al-Sheikh, recently was forced to defend religious rulings against accusations of excessive political influence from the government.
Being accused of allowing political matters to have influence over religious matters is a damning charge. Most Islamic political thought -- including Wahhabi thought -- argues that politics is and should be subservient to religion. In fact, most Islamic political thought makes no distinction between political and religious rule.
The Wahhabis take this position to a radical level, seeing politics as the rightful domain of the religious leadership and other pious elites. By challenging the credibility of the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, the opposition challenges the legitimacy not only of the government but also the senior religious leadership.
Money, Money, Money
Al Qaeda control of the kingdom does not necessarily mean either the overthrow of the House of Saud -- at least at this stage -- or the more immediate destruction of the country's oil infrastructure or disruption of oil exports. The kingdom is infinitely more valuable with its oil sector intact. Al Qaeda will concentrate on weakening the regime and driving Westerners from the Arabian Peninsula for the foreseeable future.
Al Qaeda does not want to trigger a U.S. invasion or any other serious political backlash like a full-scale revolution or a fracturing of the country that would restrict Riyadh's political reach. If it can find a cooperative branch or a support base within the royal family, then the "regime" could persist -- at least in name -- even as Riyadh's political orientation shifts.
There could be short-term reasons for not completely displacing the House of Saud. The most immediate is money. Al Qaeda has long relied on financing from the kingdom. There are persistent rumors that some members of the royal family back the militants financially and politically. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reports that al Qaeda has spent around $30 million annually to finance operations. The U.S. commission looking into the events of Sept. 11 concluded that most of those funds came from "witting and unwitting donors, primarily in Persian Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia." Some of the money is believed to have passed through charities.
The Saudi government claims it is going after the charities as a way of cutting off the financing. It has assumed control over the Al-Haramain Foundation, a Saudi-based international charity that the U.S. government has linked to al Qaeda. Significantly, no key personnel, including the charity's founder and chairman Aqeel al-Aqeel, have been arrested.
Al Qaeda needs to keep the money flowing, and that means not endangering either its allies in the kingdom or the primary sources of revenue -- like oil exports. If the regime moves aggressively to shut down its sources of financing, al Qaeda's calculus could change. It could accelerate the timing for targeting the regime directly. But at this stage, one charity less will not prevent al Qaeda's operations inside or beyond Saudi Arabia.
The Oil Weapon
The current phase of the war in Saudi Arabia is focused on getting Westerners out of the kingdom. The withdrawal of the foreigners accomplishes the goal of weakening U.S.-Saudi ties and leaving the energy industry fully in Saudi hands. Driving the Western infidels out of the kingdom would also serve as a powerful recruiting tool for al Qaeda.
Ousting Westerners also opens thousands of positions in the energy and defense industries, positions al Qaeda will hope to see filled with Saudis or other Muslims sympathetic to its worldview. Taking control of the energy industry would give al Qaeda global leverage. Running the energy industry without the Western brain trust would be a challenge and could lead to a serious decline in Saudi output capacity. But with the resources available to Aramco and other Saudi energy firms, a smaller but steady output still would give al Qaeda enormous political leverage abroad.
It is not in al Qaeda's interest at this phase in the war to strike at the Saudi oil infrastructure. Doing so would endanger a key source of its financing, would be highly unpopular with the Saudi people -- who view the oil as their God-given inheritance -- and would not further the movement's military objectives.
The Second Ikhwan Uprising
The next phase of the war is less certain, although it might imitate the last great rebellion in the kingdom.
In 1902, Abdel-Aziz bin Abdel-Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud, the founder of modern-day Saudi Arabia, returned from exile in Kuwait and seized Riyadh and much of the surrounding central Najd territory. Al-Saud -- who is better known as Ibn Saud -- cobbled together an army known as the Ikhwan from several of Arabia's nomadic and seminomadic tribes (bedouin) to conquer Hail, the Hijaz and other parts of what now makes up the kingdom. By 1913 his forces had taken the oil-rich al-Ahsa or Eastern Province. In 1917, with the help of the Ikhwan bedouins, Ibn Saud inched his way toward Hail, the headquarters of the rival al Rashid tribe in northern Arabia, eventually capturing it.
By 1926, he had ousted the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, and taken the Arabian Peninsula's western flank, known as the Hijaz. Ibn Saud's territorial ambitions were halted soon thereafter. Britain had placed sons of the Sharif on the thrones in Iraq and Transjordan, and cut a deal with Riyadh to limit raids into these territories.
After the territorial expansion reached its limits, Ibn Saud moved to disband the Ikhwan army and settle the bedouin. The bedouin, however, expected massive booty from the Hijaz and Hail victories and wanted to keep raiding into Iraq rather than settle down.
Two of the Ikhwan leaders -- who had expected but did not receive cushy government appointments -- turned on Ibn Saud and began challenging Riyadh. Ibn Bijad, the top Ikhwan leader, had expected to be appointed military chief after the kingdom's consolidation, but he was dismissed instead. It is thought that Ibn Saud feared Bijad, and Faisal al Duwish, the Ikhwan's other commander, posed a threat. In 1929, the Ikhwan rose in unsuccessful rebellion against the regime.
There are a number of parallels between the current al Qaeda offensive and the 1929 Ikhwan rebellion.
Like Ibn Bijad, Osama bin Laden thought he would be rewarded with a high-ranking military position upon his return from Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviets. Instead, he was ignored and then denied permission to form an army to fight against an invasion after Saddam Hussein's forces took Kuwait in August 1990.
The Ikhwan accused Ibn Saud of dealing with the infidels, referring to Riyadh's relationship with Britain. Al Qaeda has condemned the Saudi government for dealing with the infidels, Americans and Westerners in general.
A critical divergence, however, is in targeting. Although the idea of a Saudi nationality did not exist back then, the underlying tribal alliance system prevailed and the Ikhwan deliberately attacked tribes loyal to Ibn Saud.
Conclusion: The Second Phase
Al Qaeda has not taken this road -- at least not yet. But after cleansing the holy lands of infidels, the movement will have thousands of radical and eager militants expecting action. Al Qaeda also has repeatedly and blatantly accused the Saudi regime of corruption and hypocrisy and is not likely simply to close up shop just because all the Americans have been routed. In fact, the militants have already struck at Saudi intelligence officials and headquarters.
The war is a guerrilla conflict with militant attacks focused on Westerners. The next phase, however, will see a shift. The militants will reorient the conflict to directly targeting Saudi authorities. They will also move to establish themselves as a legitimate and viable political alternative.
Al Qaeda is also laying the foundation for a new regime. In a taped speech that was aired in January 2004, a speaker -- believed to be bin Laden -- calls for the establishment of a legitimate and righteous political leadership to replace the corrupt Arab governments now in power. He says: "The honest people who are concerned about this situation, such as the ulema, leaders who are obeyed among their people, dignitaries, notables and merchants should get together and meet in a safe place away from the shadow of these suppressive regimes and form a council for Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd [literally 'those who loose and bind,' a reference to honest, wise and righteous people who can appoint or remove a ruler in Islamic tradition] to fill the vacuum caused by the religious invalidation of these regimes and their mental deficiency." The implication is pointed: Riyadh is corrupt and a new leadership must arise to replace it.
STRATFOR sources inside the kingdom all agree: The anti-Western guerrilla war is only the initial phase. The countdown to a confrontation between the mujahideen and the Saudi government is certain. It is only a matter of time.
