U.S., Pakistan's Uneasy Interdependence (Dispatch)
Video Transcript:
Video Transcript
Gen. John Allen, commander of the U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan, met with Pakistan's military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani in the Pakistan on July 27. The visit was the latest in a series by senior American officials since November 2011, when 24 soldiers were killed in a U.S. air raid on a Pakistani military outpost, bringing relations between the two countries to an all-time low. More intense diplomacy can be expected on both sides in trying to overcome this hurdle as Pakistan struggles to manage the expected fallout from a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Pakistan refuses to open NATO supply lines through its country until the U.S. issues a formal apology for the November raid and ends unilateral U.S. operations on Pakistani soil, among other demands. The U.S. has thus far rejected these demands, but talks on other issues, such as the joint coordination of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, continue. Meanwhile, there has been a public war of words between the two sides over the U.S. pressure on Pakistan to crack down on militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan, particularly those belonging to the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban movement.
Allen's visit is unlikely to produce a major breakthrough. It does, however, underscore both sides' need for cooperation. The U.S. needs Pakistan's help if it hopes to withdraw its forces by 2014 - and leave behind a viable political and security arrangement. Pakistan needs the United States for existential reasons, given its own deteriorating political, economic and security situation.
That said, relations with the United States have deteriorated, despite mutual need, as Pakistani civilian government have gained more influence over policy making and as it’s become apparent that Washington has developed a unilateral intelligence network inside Pakistan -- something wholly intolerable to Islamabad.
The Pakistanis are also deeply concerned that the United States, lacking a viable policy on post-NATO Afghanistan, will simply withdraw, leaving the Pakistanis to deal with the chaos left behind. This is why the Pakistanis are racing against time to get a better handle on their side of the border, which has experienced an increase in Taliban activity over the past decade.
That objective is running into major problems with Pakistani Taliban based in the border areas in eastern Afghanistan -- particularly Kunar -- who have already begun cross-border raids threatening the gains Pakistan has made in its counterinsurgency offensives. On July 26, a group of militants crossed the border into Pakistan's northwestern Dir district and attacked a military outpost killing a dozen soldiers -- beheading several of them. This incidents and others like it, allow Islamabad to counter U.S. pressure that Pakistan is not doing enough to crack down on Afghan Taliban sanctuaries by making the case that NATO is not able to do so either.
In their meeting, Kayani likely reiterated to Allen that the Haqqanis are far more embedded in eastern Afghanistan than they are in North Waziristan, it is from there that they launch their attacks, and if NATO can't control the situation in Afghanistan, then how can they expect Pakistan do so with fewer resources on its side. Given the bilateral atmosphere, the Pakistanis are unlikely to succeed in convincing the Americans of their point of view. What this means is that the deadlock in the relationship is likely to persist for some time to come. In the meantime, the talks are likely to continue along with low-level tactical cooperation.
