North Korea's Newest Threat
Video Transcript:
Video Transcript
North Korea's withdrawal from the 1953 Armistice Agreement and its 1992 non-aggression pact with South Korea has raised both concern and confusion: concern in that Pyongyang has shown several times it is willing to violate agreements and engage in hostile actions toward South Korea, and confusion in regards to its timing and intent.
The symbolism of the 60th anniversary of the armistice approaching in July is certainly part of the equation. Also, North Korea warned ahead of the March 1 kick-off of the annual U.S.-South Korea Foal Eagle military exercises that the military training this year could trigger a new Korean War. But North Korea said it would withdraw from the Armistice Agreement on March 11, start of the Key Resolve combined and joint command post exercise, a smaller subset of the two-monthslong training cycle focusing on the movement and integration of reinforcements in a combat situation. Overall, the Foal Eagle exercises involve air, land and sea forces in simulated combat, while Key Resolve is less about combat and more about logistics. But this year is the first in which South Korea is taking the lead in Key Resolve, another step toward the transfer of military authority on the Korean Peninsula to South Korea in 2015.
Pyongyang's choice to focus on Key Resolve, then, may have less to do with the actual military training aspect than with the upcoming shift of wartime operational control to South Korea, as opposed to U.S. forces. The North could be testing the South Korean resolve and perhaps seeking to cause friction between Seoul and Washington by raising the specter of war. In addition, South Korean President Park Geun-hye only took office Feb. 25, and he has already run into trouble domestically with her choice for defense minister. Pyongyang's threats at this time, then, are a challenge to the incoming South Korean government and may also be aimed at the changes in the U.S. administration.
In short, North Korea is timing its threats to coincide with a moment of minimal coordination between -- and within -- Washington and Seoul. But if the "when" makes sense, the question remains as to "why?" As we have noted before, North Korea's strategy has been one that combines a sense of fearsomeness, weakness and unpredictability to manipulate the major powers around the Peninsula into keeping the regime alive, even if largely isolated. But over time, this policy has started to lose efficacy, and the threatening actions that once caused rapid diplomatic shuttling and immediate calls for talks now barely raise an eyebrow. North Korea in the past could simply threaten to withdraw from some treaty or agreement, and there would be international consternation and moves to engage Pyongyang. Now, North Korea can launch satellites and test nuclear devices and the response is a few more sanctions and little other interest.
Even the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette ChonAn and the shelling of civilians on Yeonpyeong Island did not send the international community rushing to the negotiating table with North Korea. With its tried-and-true policy growing more difficult to sustain, Pyongyang is seeking to change the regional psychology, to again raise the specter of imminent war. But given the flagging responses to North Korean provocations, it may take a lot more than a threat to pull out of an armistice the North already violated to convince Washington and Seoul that Pyongyang is not the boy who cried wolf. And that shift could prove very risky.
