Negotiations Over a Transitional Syrian Government
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Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, Stratfor cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Video Transcript:
Colin Chaman: While many of us have been enjoying the lassitude of Christmas, Moscow has been a buzz with high-level discussions about the future of Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says time is running out. After talks in the Russian capital on Thursday with Syria's foreign minister, he's hosting a meeting this weekend, at which the United Nations and the Arab League special representative Lakhdar Brahimi will set out proposals for a transitional government to be established in Damascus. The shape and form of such a government is the hard part.
I'm Colin Chapman, and this is Stratfor's Agenda. With me this week to discuss the Moscow talks is Director of Analysis Reva Bhalla. Reva, negotiations like these are always intriguing. Can you shed more light on them?
Reva Bhalla: Basically the proposal at hand is for Assad to remain in power through the next year -- his term expires in 2014 -- to create a transitional government that would divide the government between Assad's forces and the opposition and basically disqualifying Assad from running in the next election in 2014. Now, there are a lot of holes in this plan as you can imagine, and really, I think the biggest thing missing from it is taking into account the very deep sectarian grievances that are driving this conflict. So what it comes to Assad -- and if you do an empathetic analysis of what he's thinking -- his priority is to protect himself, his family, his clan, and then get guarantees for the Alawite community. There's still no serious discussion of immunity, and the international legal regime on immunity makes it very difficult for any one stakeholder -- whether it's the U.S. or Russia -- to actually guarantee Assad the level of immunity he would need to voluntarily step down. So his forces are going to keep fighting whether in a conventional form or eventually through an insurgency. So you can pretty much forget about maintaining a real cease-fire during this period, not to mention the fragments within the opposition that make a negotiation very difficult. The idea of keeping Assad in power of course is going to be a very divisive issue. So, a lot of different reasons why the negotiation itself is unlikely to result in a meaningful deal, but there are a lot of reasons why the talks are going to keep going. Assad has an interest in keeping them going, maintaining leverage through the chemical weapons threat. Russia as well is going to try to maintain leverage through these negotiations as it talks to the U.S.
Colin: And of course the Americans have been involved?
Reva: Yes, of course. The United States wants to avoid a military intervention in the Islamic world. It wants to show that it's doing something about this conflict. The negotiations show that, but as far as resulting in a stable transition, that's probably not within our sights anytime soon.
Colin: Another problem: Any intervention needs enforcement. Presumably that means U.N. peacekeepers or other peacekeepers and neutralizing the chemical weapons.
Reva: Well the concern here really is over the chemical weapons threats and the ability of any one player to come in and secure those stockpiles. And so that's where Russia comes in because it's really trying to show that it still has a close relationship with the current government to have strong intelligence on the location of those stockpiles and giving guarantees that they won't be used. We'll see how good those guarantees are. The United States, of course, wants to avoid this multidivisional sort of intervention that would bog it down in the Islamic world in yet another military confrontation. But it is really the only military force in the region that would have the ability to carry out an operation like that. But again, it's something that it is going to try to avoid at all costs.
Colin: One of the big issues is some kind of amnesty for Bashar al Assad. But two points here: First, who's going to accept him? That's big ask for any country. And doesn't this future, such as it is, really lie with the war crimes court in The Hague?
Reva: Right. So as far as who would accept Assad, the rumor is he would go to Venezuela. Venezuela, of course, is dealing with its own problems with Chavez's health deteriorating day by day, and the need to create a stable enough succession plan there. Now when it comes to Assad, there really is no way to guarantee immunity for him. For now, Russia can have a veto in the Security Council to avoid a referral of Assad or anyone in his inner circle to The Hague. Then again, there could be a new government in Syria still very bent on revenge against Assad that could try to refer the case to The Hague retroactively. And so there are a number of legal loopholes that could be pursued. There really is no sense of security for Assad. Even if Russia tries to negotiate some sort of immunity, there's still going to be a big question mark of who can actually guarantee it. And so that is what's really going to drive the Alawite forces to continue fighting. They can buy time with negotiations and again use the chemical weapons threat as leverage in the talks. But, this is not a fight that is going to be over anytime soon.
Colin: Let's explore some other intriguing issues. Until recently, the Russians shied away from any cooperation with the Americans on, pretty well, any aspect of the Middle East. What do these current talks tell us about what could happen to U.S.-Russian relations next year?
Reva: The Syrian negotiation definitely intersects with the broader U.S.-Russian relationship. If we take stock of that relationship right now, you know, we have a lot of unsettled issues between Washington and Moscow -- everything from the extent to which the United States is going to pursue its ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe; how large its military footprint will be in this region; when it comes to Russia trying to basically declare territory off limits to the United States in its near abroad. So, in the Baltic region and in Poland, we have seen some pretty heavy resistance against Russia, especially in the energy sphere. If we go down, we see that in Belarus, Russia has done a pretty effective job of neutralizing that country according to its interests. Ukraine is still trying to hold out against Russia and is having a lot more difficulty in doing so this year. And then if we look across the region in Azerbaijan, the Caucasus and Georgia, Russia has a new ally there that it can keep working to pursue its interests. This is still very much a project in the works. And Russia wants guarantees from the U.S. that it won't face interference as Russia tries to achieve negative control in its periphery. Now, with those issues unsettled, you can see how very thorny, loud issues like Syria or like Russia's relationship with Iran would be used by Moscow to hold Washington's attention and to broaden the negotiation to other issues as Russia also tries to maintain leverage in the Levant region when it is obviously going to face a setback without a strong ally in Damascus.
Colin: And there are other actors watching form the wings. Iran is perhaps the most important, with whom the U.S. has been having secret talks. What's the status of those talks?
Reva: Those talks aren't really going anywhere right now for several reasons. Iran is in a very different position this year from the last. It's been facing regional setbacks of enormous magnitude when you consider what's happening in Syria and the potential for Iran to lose its leverage not only in Syria but also in Lebanon. And so its going to be fighting to maintain its interests there, really playing more of a spoiler role than anything else and trying to sow enough chaos to maintain its relevance in the conflict and thus try to use that in a negotiation. We also can see how the sanctions are having a considerable effect on the Iranian economy. That's going to translate to greater political tensions within the regime elite. And so Iran is facing a very difficult year, even though it still maintains important leverage in deterring an attack, including its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is not in a confortable position, and frankly it needs this negotiation far more than the United States does. So from the U.S. perspective, it actually makes a lot more sense to allow these problems to run their course and essentially allow Iran to weaken on its own since Iran no longer poses the same level of strategic threat as it did before in extending a sphere of influence all the way from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. Iran's regional ascent is now on the decline, and it's going to still be a big problem in the region -- again in much more of a spoiler status -- but it's going to be much more focused now on trying to defend its interests in Iraq. We're already seeing more of an emboldened Sunni community starting to challenge Shia interests there.
Colin: Finally, a what if. What if there is a deal? Presumably that means the Baathists stay in power. This won't end the civil war, will it?
Reva: Diplomacy will continue. There will be talks of proposals for cease-fires and transitional governments. There may well be a provisional government that is recognized by major players in the international system. But does that preclude a civil war? I don' think so. I don't think we are going to see that sort of stable transition that everyone is hoping for. Again, there are some very deep sectarian grievances in play here. Many Alawites have already retreated to the coast, mainly in the Tartus area and in Latakia. They are basically seeing their worst-case scenario. They're preparing for it. The Kurds are preparing for it. Hezbollah is preparing for it in Lebanon. And I think you could probably get a truer sense of where this conflict is going by paying attention to those players on the ground as opposed to the loftier diplomatic discussions taking place in these major capitals and in the U.N.
Colin: Reva, thanks very much, and a very happy new year.
