Iraq: 10 Years Later
Video Transcript:
Video Transcript:
A series of explosions occurred in Baghdad on the anniversary of the U.S. invasion in Iraq. Some 50 people were killed and nearly 200 wounded in the attacks, which targeted mostly Shiite areas of the capital. Ten years after the U.S. invasion, deadly attacks in Iraq are still making the daily headlines.
The war in Iraq by no means ended with the U.S. withdrawal in late 2011. Rather, it entered a new, yet all too familiar period of ethnic and sectarian fragmentation. The Shiite-dominated government led by controversial Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was quick to consolidate his power in Baghdad, and he used that power to try and simultaneously weaken his Sunni and Kurdish adversaries. The Kurds resented Baghdad for trying to curb the Kurdish northern region's energy autonomy, while the Sunnis resented Baghdad for continuing to sideline from the security apparatus and government. Even several Shiite factions have been alienated by al-Maliki's allegedly authoritarian ways.
But al-Maliki was by no means a unique personality for Iraq. The country's largely artificial borders encompass three highly distinct ethnic and religious factions, each of which are in turn divided by clan, ideology and natural wealth. That an authoritarian personality would emerge in this difficult geopolitical climate should not come as a surprise.
The question moving forward is whether the current dynamic in Iraq can persist or if much more severe fragmentation is in store. Here is where we need to look for the regional environment for clues.
As we expected, the conflict in Syria is emboldening Iraq's Sunnis to challenge the Shiite government in Baghdad. Since last year, Sunni protests have persisted in Iraq's Anbar and Nineveh provinces. So far, the al-Maliki government has managed this resurgence in Sunni unrest through crackdowns and by playing various factions off one another. But there are a number of factors that could undermine al-Maliki's containment strategy in the months ahead.
As we can see from the intensification of jihadist attacks in Iraq, particularly those targeting sensitive Shiite areas, jihadist fighters in Iraq have a strategic intent to rile up disaffected Iraqi Sunnis and provoke Iraqi Shia to create the ideal conditions for a sustainable insurgency. This will take time to develop, but the intensifying Sunni rebellion in Syria is increasing traffic of Sunni fighters between Syria and Iraq's western provinces.
But here comes the real kicker. Unlike, previous iterations, there is no outside player with the combined political will and capability to stabilize Iraq. Before it was the Ottomans, the British and more recently, the United States, that attempted to play this role for their own interests. Today, the United States is exercising a great deal of restraint in managing instability in the Islamic world. There is no U.S. to reinforce the Kurds, to keep distance between Sunni jihadists and nationalists or to contain Shiite militiamen. Instead, this battleground is falling to the regional powers, notably Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. And when the regional powers get more involved, Mesopotamia will get pulled in multiple directions and the internal divisions will deepen that much more.
