Eurasia's underbelly - game's on
According to Washington’s official stance, America’s activity within the area of the Central Asia is exclusively related to preserving its presence in Afghanistan (even the term “promotion of democratic values” is no longer mentioned).In addition, think-tanks are no longer the only ones admitting that even though the USA is less involved in the affairs of Afghanistan, it should, nevertheless, keep its eyes open when it comes to a competition between America, China and Russia in a region called “underbelly of Eurasia”. What is more, it should also think of its new strategy since Russia’s presence is more palpable. It does not, however, have to result in a Moscow-Washington dispute.
A report of The Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The United States and Central Asia after 2014,” indicates America’s permanent stance on its diplomacy. The report’s author Jeffrey Mankoff writes: “While Washington will have more pressing interests elsewhere, including in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, it needs to avoid the temptation to turn its back on Central Asia. With Central Asia’s own future increasingly in doubt, the United States needs to – publicly and privately – emphasize that its interests in Central Asia are enduring, and that it will remain engaged at multiple levels even after its combat troops have left Afghanistan. Even though U.S. priorities are shifting at the global level, Washington will continue to have important interests at stake in Central Asia that require sustained engagement. These include preventing the emergence of failed states that could become a staging ground for international terrorism, avoiding regional conflicts that could draw in neighboring powers (many of them with nuclear weapons), and limiting Central Asia’s ability to act as a transit route for transnational threats such as drugs. Moreover, having entrée to Central Asia enhances U.S. ability to influence developments in Afghanistan – as well as Pakistan – which both face worsening insurgencies and the growth of radical forces.”[1]
This situation means for Washington simply accepting a 21st century logic of geopolitical discourse. It seems, however, that it refers to the 19th century “Great Game” of the Great Britain and Russia. At present, not unlike in the past, it is impossible to gain or hold the position of a superpower within the areas of interest in Asia and within the routes, where resources are transported – not unless one gains clear advantage or works out a relatively long-lasting modus operandi in the region of Central Asia. One should also bear in mind that the previous power relationship lasted (despite some temporal pauses) for 72 years – from the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Thus, even though the geostrategic situation seems to be unstable, or at least its future is hard to foresee, it does not mean that it will not undergo a relatively permanent change.
America, or any other participant of that geopolitical game, cannot think only in terms of taking control over strategic points of a given area. Cases of Afghanistan and Iraq are simple examples proving that in order to seize control over one country and its communication trails, full political dominance is required. This dominance is impossible without a political and, thus, also an ideological, adjustment. Then, a military and economic dominance can turn into a multidimensional relationship, maintenance of which will lay within the interests of the countries involved (or at least within the interests of a widely understood power). However, the point is that implementation of the Western standards has not yet worked out in the regions, where interventions had been undertaken. This, in turn, is an indication for America to be wary in promoting its democratic values and human rights.
Statement of Thomas Graham, the Managing Director of Kissinger Associates, proves that observation. He emphasizes that, besides the traditional trends in regional geopolitics of the USA, i.e. ensuring local balance of powers (any country should not dominate the neighboring one) and involving all entities in global economy, another trends should beaded. An example of such a new trend is a continued competition for natural resources, deposits of which are located in Central Asia. However, the above mentioned competition should not result in an outbreak of an uncontrolled armed conflict. Moreover, it should be guaranteed that the region will not become again a basis for activity of international terrorists. Back to the statement of Thomas Graham – generally, it was emphasized that the statement did not mention a respect for democratic values and human rights, the two most important PR-concepts as far as Washington’s policy is concerned. In fact, there is nothing surprising about it since two America’s ”vassals”, i.e. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are not associated with these concepts. One can even assume that as soon as the political system of these countries will turn into the only logical and rational one, i.e. that of Eurasia, America will remind, both itself and the world, of democracy imperfections in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Nonetheless, it is not a necessary condition needed to cause such a situation. It would also happen provided that the current regimes come to an end – then they should be replaced by the similar ones, however, more democratic – at least in the beginning.
It is just a practical reasoning. Taking into consideration the current economic situation, it is hard to imagine more troops of the US Army in this region. There are also no foundations for increasing the economic activity there, at least not in sectors, the potential partners are interested in. These are, first of all, post-soviet infrastructure and activities leading to inhabitants’ prosperity. Therefore, a reform of a political system is, in such the case, considered to be a substitute method for economic competition (it refers to China in particular because it has too many, not allocated investment funds).
Nonetheless, no one probably doubts that it is impossible to ignore the economic issues. For example, S. Frederick Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, who took part in a panel of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, identified three main priorities of the USA related to its activity in Central Asia. These priorities are: resources, support of transcontinental trade and prevention of resources-based conflicts. As it turns out, he took into consideration purely economic issues. The USA considers Central Asia to be a strategic source of energy reserves and a “tap”, which can be turned on and off. America believes that this kind of policy can be pursed in almost all Eurasia. In spite of some hopes for a different scenario, cooperation with Russia in that matter seems to be unavoidable. What is worse, it also seems that the time when Russia would accept a possibility of a multilateral cooperation with the USA and countries from Central Asia, e.g. on energy projects, is gone. Currently, Russia pursues its own goals and concludes its own bilateral agreements with selected partners. When it comes to an attempt to get to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from the South, i.e. from Afghanistan and Pakistan, without dealing with a situation in Iran, it can be regarded only as playing for a time, i.e. preserving the current status quo which gets worse and worse. Besides, analysts do notice it.
Although the previously mentioned think-tanks are in favour of an imperial policy pursued by Washington, they draw a clear distinction between the current situation in the region and that in the ‘90s. Some ten or fifteen years ago Russia resigned from being involved in energetics, logistics or defense, whereas, at present, it comes back and is active even in sectors previously dominated by the USA. Mankoff admits that unless America cooperates with Russia, it will not be able to achieve anything in this region.
Hence, what solutions are proposed?
Lower number of American troops (it is closely related both to the situation in Afghanistan and to a plan of keeping Russia calm), increased economic activity (in order to keep up with competing China) and deciding on the matter of “democracy” and “human rights,” i.e. if and when to use these arguments. Generally, according to analysts, despite lack of common interests with Central Asia, America cannot get “pushed” out from that region. It does not, however, mean that it cannot happen in the future.
Quite interestingly, some of the Russian analysts agree with these observations. Additionally, they try to predict what type of advantage Americans can and should gain in particular countries. When describing the republics of Central Asia, Andriej Grozin, Head of Central Asia and Kazakhstan Department of the Institute of CIS countries, stated (thinking excessively ahead): “It is difficult to find another such region as Central Asia, where undermining any of the five states can trigger the collapse of the whole pyramid. So for those who are ready to undermine this “Eurasian Balkans,” the only question is which of the States should be the first to push for maximum effect.” One can doubt whether the appearance of some unexpected changes in Kazakhstan, which is the centre of Eurasia, would have the same impact on the stability of the whole region as it would be in the case of strategically dependent Tajikistan. Nevertheless, Grozin’s tactical observations do not lose their validity.
Grozin does not ponder whether the USA will run an operation of changing political systems and increasing its influences in the republics of Central Asia, but rather when it will do it and what kind of involvement will be needed. “Now the United States rely on Uzbekistan, which is geopolitically most convenient: bound up with all the countries of the region, the Uzbek area provides a significant increase in control of all of Central Asia. The question is how to implement this control: using the current government, or by initiating a new appearance.” asks the analyst and adds that a gradual withdrawal of American troops and end of friendship with President Karimow are most probable. “…and then we will see. (…) the fate of the former leaders of countries emerging from the “Arab Spring” have demonstrated a simple fact: No warranties given by Washington cannot be trusted.” Grozin warns the Uzbek dictator. It can be regarded both as a sober judgment of the situation in Tashkent and as an encouragement so that Karimow finally understands that his personal interests bind him with a bloc which considers law and order less strictly than others.
As far as Kazakhstan is concerned, Grozin admits that the only mean of internal destabilization of the country ruled by Nursułtan Nazarbajew is a civil war. The “Arab spring”-solution will not work out in this case since it would be necessary to set the elites at variance and to escalate the conflict, emphasizes the analyst. In the case of Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, in turn, even in the best scenario for the involved external operators, the political system can be influenced only partially and indirectly, as it was during the peak of the civil war in 1992-1993. The neighbouring countries are simply able to block Tajikistan and ignore its problems. Furthermore, Turkmenistan (along with its gas deposits) can learn a lesson only when competing with Iran. When one tries to trigger some internal changes, it will only result in a waste of time and money. Far more effective would be to change the ruling elite when “democratizing Iran,” concludes Grozin. He also points out that it would be aimless to destabilize the situation in Kirgizstan because it preserves some political values corresponding to the Western ones. What is more, authorities in Bishkek do not constitute a geopolitical value. Their task may be rather to counteract some regional ambitions (particularly China’s economic plans), which is why they have a strategic value for other authorities in the region, assumes Grozin and adds that it can come to yet another revolution, this time, however, in Kirgizstan (provided that it would be necessary to increase influences from the outside).
As one can see, Russia takes seriously the above mentioned scenarios, thus, it can be assumed that it also tries to prepare for all eventualities. It means that Russia does it by pursuing its own goals, i.e. mainly by expanding its customs union, which is probably the most familiar type of cooperation with the post-Soviet states. Besides, Russia’s hydro projects run together with Kyrgyzstan may be of great importance, although Moscow wants to have its own hydroelectric power chains built not only together with Bishkek, but also with Tashkent, Astana and Dushanbe. Moreover, Russia comes back to Tajikistan in a military and in an economic sense (in accordance with the agreement of 5th October 2012) and increases its military cooperation with Kazakhstan (recently – S-300 air defense system). Besides, Russia is and will be militarily present also in Kyrgyzstan and what is important –in four areas: army signal centre, research and undersea test centre, research laboratories as well as air force and air defense. When one adds also strengthened Russian-Armenian relationships, greater involvement of Yerevan in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Moscow’s recent decision to openly support Teheran in selected matters, it is clear that Russia may not seek some arguable issues as far as American geopolitics is concerned, however, should Moscow find it, it will not accept acting only in a defensive and passive way.
As Amir Taheri points out in the „New York Post,” Russia and Iran cooperate in vast fields. It can, however, be stated that they are in some or other way related to Teheran’s conflict with the Western countries. Part of the aforementioned cooperation spheres are: training course for Islamic Revolutionary Guard in crowd control and civil unrest (to prevent an Iranian version of the “Arab Spring”), training and equipping Iranian security forces to deal with civil unrest (justified by cooperating in intelligence gathering and the fight “against terrorism, people-trafficking, and drug-smuggling”). Besides, improvement of Moscow-Teheran relations in the economic sphere, particularly in an area of resources and energetics, should be mentioned. That improvement could be noticed after a February meeting of the Iran-Russia Joint Trade and Economic Cooperation Commission. Commission’s resolutions refer, among others, to: Russian companies declaring their participation in extracting Iranian oil (at least 90 million tons), and a turnkey construction of Iranian systems for oil and gas extraction (including refinery and underground gas storage). Furthermore, quite importantly, two concerns, namely, JSC Inter RAO JES and JSC VO Technopromexport announced that they will take part in modernising two power plants, Raminand Shahid, built by Russians in Persia. They will also cooperate in building new power stations and transmission lines. Hence, it is obvious that Russia differs from the Western superpowers since it appreciates peaceful development of Iranian nuclear energy (e.g. completing construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant). In short – it means that Russia accepted the challenge, i.e. it responds to Americans presence in Central Asia by its own activity in this region. It is also present in spheres, in which Washington does not want to or is not able to be active.
Summing up, a game (probably it will not yet turn into an armed conflict) for the future of Eurasia will take place in two areas, i.e. in and near Caucasus, and in Central Asia. As one can see, the final set up of pawns and figures involved in this game has begun.
