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European tempers flared on Jan. 22 when U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld -- referring to French and German opposition to a U.S.-led war against Iraq -- said the two countries represent "old Europe." The comment, not surprisingly, hit an especially sensitive nerve in Paris, which is finding itself increasingly at odds with its ally across the Atlantic.
It is clear that France cannot hope to compete with the United States on the global stage. It is the United States -- not France -- that reigns as the global technology leader. France has less than one-sixth of the GDP of the United States and only one-fifth its population. Washington consistently ranks at the top of productivity indices, while France's once highly ranked position has weakened steadily over the past decade. France might maintain one of Europe's strongest militaries, but defense spending is a paltry 7 percent of the United States'.
This pervasive economic and military power has allowed Washington to expand influence in regions that a lesser power couldn't even consider. The United States now even has a tight relationship with most of the Central European and Caucasian states, much to the chagrin of their former imperial master, Russia.
France's former colonies have not been exempted either. The United States has used energy diplomacy to become the dominant foreign power throughout West Africa and recently began free-trade negotiations with Morocco. It also is exploring the option of signing similar deals with southern African states as well.
In the French mind, this activity has transformed the United States into a "hyperpower," one that France is discovering it lacks the ability to counter even in its own backyard.
The U.S.-French Split and the Creation of "Europe"
France's "problem" with U.S. power began shortly after World War II. As its post-war recovery solidified, Paris began to realize that Washington would not sacrifice its Cold War goals in favor of French efforts to reassert colonial claims. These two conflicting ideologies eventually crashed headlong in 1956, when the absence of U.S. support caused a fuming France to follow a humiliated United Kingdom into withdrawal from the Suez.
London learned the bitter lesson that it could never again afford to be on the wrong side of Washington, but Paris took away a very different lesson: Never again be forced to depend upon the United States.
For France to shape events on the global stage, it first needed to become -- or create -- a global power. It is no coincidence that the Treaty of Rome that formed the European Economic Community was signed less than six months after the Suez hostilities began. It was convenient that anything that helped band western Europe together enjoyed strong U.S. support, and the European Community rapidly became a useful complement -- even if clearly a junior partner -- to NATO in the Cold War.
But in the years since, France has discovered that a united Europe is not the vehicle of its ambitions that it once hoped. A European super-state is useful to France only if it can control its policies.
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