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Hamas' trademark green flags waved over the Preventive Security headquarters in Gaza City on June 14. The headquarters is one of the last major Fatah compounds that Hamas has taken over after five days of deadly clashes in the Gaza Strip. Reports indicate that President Mahmoud Abbas has dissolved the Saudi-brokered "unity government," though the merits of such a move remain unclear.
Abbas has made such threats before, and he knows that he will be facing a full-scale civil war in the territories that would result in the creation of de facto mini-states, with Hamas in charge of Gaza and Fatah in charge of the West Bank, if Hamas is forced out of the government. He also knows Fatah would have almost no chance of winning a clear majority if new elections were held, and that his fractured Fatah movement might not be able to regain its current position if an all-out factional battle ensues. The fighting already is so bad that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, led by Muhammad Mahdi Akef, is being asked to mediate the crisis, and Abbas has given orders to Fatah members to fight back against Hamas.
Fatah is weak, and Hamas knows it. And this is precisely what is giving Hamas the confidence to go on the offensive and essentially establish what is being referred to as "Hamastan" in the Gaza Strip. In Hamas' mind, the time has come to redraw the lines on the power-distribution map based on its gains on the battlefield. The root of this bitter power struggle is control over the Palestinian security forces, which Hamas needs in order to ensure the longevity of its militant arm.
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