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VLADIMIR RODIONOV/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
Summary
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev went to Uzbekistan on Jan. 22 to meet with Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Medvedev’s visit comes on the heels of U.S. Central Command chief
Gen. David Petraeus’ eight-day tour of six countries in Central and South Asia and an announcement that the United States has secured alternative “logistical routes into
Afghanistan” through Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors. Medvedev’s visit is meant to counter Petraeus’ trip until Washington and Moscow can strike a deal on the United
States’ use of former Soviet turf to send supplies to U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
Analysis
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev traveled to Uzbekistan on Jan. 22 to meet with his counterpart, Islam Karimov. The publicized reason for the trip is for energy talks,
but the trip comes on the heels of U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus’ whirlwind tour through six countries in Central and South Asia. Petraeus said Jan. 20
that the United States has secured alternative "logistical routes into Afghanistan"
through its Central Asian neighbors, reducing the United States’ and NATO’s dependence on Pakistan. Medvedev’s prompt trip is to counter the U.S. moves on its former turf until a
deal between Russia and the United States is reached first.
Petraeus made the tour through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past eight days, but has not named any specific details
on which route — whether through Russia itself or just across the former
Soviet states of Central Asia — the United States favors for shipping fuel and supplies to Afghanistan.
Thus far, the deal appears to cover the transit of nonmilitary goods, without arrangements for weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles and more. A larger deal for the U.S.
military to transit equipment through former Soviet states would require a much larger and more complicated set of agreements not only with those states — each of which
has its own agenda — but with their former master, Russia.
The specific route is still unknown, as it depends on who Washington was able to strike a deal with. What is known for certain is that it will require the cooperation of multiple
states. All potential candidates must be evaluated independently in order to illustrate the complexity of the negotiation process.
Some possible routes would begin in Turkey (a NATO member) and proceed into the Caucasus — specifically Georgia and Azerbaijan. From there, the route could either connect to Russia
then Central Asia via rail lines or connect to Central Asia via barge across the Caspian Sea (bypassing Russia). Armenia does not feature in either variation for a few reasons — it
is vehemently pro-Russian, with the Russians holding a sizable military base in the country, and Armenia’s neighbors Turkey, Azerbaijan and parts of Georgia have
closed the country's borders, making transport nearly impossible.
Georgia is a country that has burned some bridges. The former Soviet state shares a land border with Turkey and lies on the Black Sea. This makes Georgia one of the few former Soviet
states with a realistic chance of diversifying its economy away from Russia (toward the European Union) and of seeking military aid against Russia (from the United States). Of course,
this hardly means Georgia has been successful.
European and U.S. assistance to Georgia was never particularly robust, and in a game of chicken with Russia, Georgia has clearly lost. The decisive moment occurred in August 2008 when
Russia trounced Georgia in a brief war, which left more than 7,000 Russian troops still
inside Georgia’s secessionist regions. Russian troops in Armenia also regularly patrol the border
with Georgia, flanking the country entirely. It would be pretty simple for Russia to clamp down on any transportation that it did not approve of.
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Azerbaijan’s geographic position — sandwiched on the east side of the Transcaucasian isthmus between Russia and Iran — is much more delicate than Georgia’s, but in many ways has proven
to be a blessing. Baku knows that unless Georgia is able to break the Soviet ties that bind, it has no chance to do so. This has encouraged Baku to be as pliable when it comes to Russia
as Georgia has been defiant; the vulnerability of its geography dictates that it takes
Russia’s interests into account.
Georgia and Azerbaijan’s geographic positions leave Washington with little option other than striking a deal with Moscow if it wants to use the Caucasus.
Central Asia comes with a whole other set of problems, in that each state is struggling over its own domestic issues, U.S. attempts to increase influence there and restrictions imposed
by Russia. Many of the Central Asian states can simply be bought, some have a game they are playing and a few have firmly made their choice to wait for Moscow’s permission to strike
such a deal with the United States. Whether the United States made arrangements to cross the Caspian or bypassed it by transiting Russian territory directly, Afghanistan cannot be accessed
from the north without arrangements with at least one Central Asian country.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is the most important of the Central Asian states, in that it is the largest and tends to serve as a bellwether for the region’s politics. But its territory is far too large to
be effectively controlled by its tiny population (the country is roughly 75 percent the size of the United States, but with a population equal to only 5 percent of the United States’).
Furthermore, Kazakhstan shares a border with Russia that is more than 1,000 miles long and depends mostly on Russia to transit its oil and natural gas exports to the West. Moscow has
Kazakhstan’s economy, cash and other resources in a vise. This could change over time as infrastructure projects come on line; prior to the Russo-Georgian war, Kazakhstan was looking for
export alternatives for its vast energy wealth, including export lines across the Caspian and to China. But these connections are not complete,
meaning that Kazakhstan must receive Moscow’s
approval for any deals with Washington. It dare not risk going its own way.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are two largely mountainous states that are not under serious consideration for any major transport routes to Afghanistan. Josef Stalin reshaped both states’ borders
in such a way that geographic and ethnic realities were fully ignored. The resultant cartographic spaghetti ensures that neither state can be successful in the long run. This makes them perennially
unstable and endemically poor, and thus both governments can be bought outright by either side — American or Russian. The Americans are interested in the pair for two reasons. First, the
United States maintains the Manas Air Base outside the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek (the Russians have their own base right next door). Second, both states have some small influence inside
Afghanistan due to their position on major drug trafficking routes.
Kyrgyzstan has hosted both the U.S. and Russian militaries not because of ideology, but because it desperately needs the cash both sides pay for their base leases. But the global financial crisis
has put Kyrgyzstan in an even worse financial situation, and the export of electricity from its hydroelectric plant — the country’s largest source of income — has been shut down due to a severe
drought in the country.
This has left Kyrgyzstan’s loyalty up to the highest bidder. According to STRATFOR sources, Petraeus offered to increase the American payments for the use of the Manas base from approximately $80
million a year to $150 million, plus a few bonuses to the government (as a whole and to specific people) for allowing continued operations. But Kyrgyzstan is in such a difficult financial
situation it has also turned to Moscow for money, and Moscow has reportedly offered $2 billion in cash if the Kyrgyz evict the Americans.
As with so many other things in this region, the only likely means of keeping the base open is to strike a deal not with the local state, but with Russia. To make sure neither state strikes a
separate deal with the Americans, the leaders of each of these countries have been summoned to Moscow next week.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is the wild card of the region; it has regional hegemonic ambitions and is the state most likely to entertain defying Moscow. As with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan’s borders
were manipulated by Stalin. But instead of hamstringing the country, Stalin inadvertently empowered it. Uzbek populations lie in all of the neighboring states, giving Tashkent the ability to
dabble in everyone’s politics. It is also self-sufficient in both food and energy, unlike any other state discussed in this article save Kazakhstan. And unlike Kazakhstan, it does notborder Russia.
But Uzbekistan does border Afghanistan. In fact, it is the most critical state for the United States to court. Not only does it enjoy road and rail connections to Afghanistan and a Soviet-era
base that the Americans have used in the past, but Uzbekistan has proven in the past few months that, despite the Russo-Georgian war, it is willing to test Russia’s ire.
Traditionally (even in Soviet times), Uzbekistan has stood up to Moscow no matter the consequences. Recently, Uzbek President Islam Karimov has suggested pulling out of alliances with Russia, such
as the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Also, during the last formal CSTO summit in December 2008, Karimov skipped out on meeting with Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin — instead meeting with Petraeus.
Russia knows that this is the country most likely to entertain Washington’s requests, so Russian President Dmitri Medvedev will arrive in Tashkent on Jan. 22 to discuss Uzbekistan’s options.
Although what Russia is bringing to the table — either as a sweetener or as a threat — is unknown.
Turkmenistan
The last Central Asian state to consider is one that — like Georgia — actually has a geography that grants it options for breaking away from Russia. Turkmenistan does not border Russia
(in fact, the bulk of its population is located in its extreme south, as far from Russia as one can get in the country); it does border another major regional power (Iran); infrastructure connecting
it to Russia goes through not one but two states; and Russia depends on Turkmenistan’s natural gas exports (not the other way around), greatly complicating Russia’s efforts to project power to
this remote corner of Central Asia.
Turkmenistan is essential to the American shipment plan if there is to ever be a network that avoids Russia proper. It is possible — not easy, but possible — to rail equipment and personnel
from Turkey through Georgia and Azerbaijan, ship it by boat across the Caspian to a Turkmen port, and then through Turkmenistan to Afghanistan on land.
Turkmenistan has traditionally tried to stay out of the tug-of-war between the United States and Russia; however, since the death of its longtime leader, Saparmurat Niyazov, the Central Asian state
has been exploring its options politically, militarily and economically. And Turkmenistan is attractive to the United States not only for its direct connections to Afghanistan, but also for its
vacant military facilities near the Afghan border that could serve as a hedge or substitute for the at-risk (and costly) air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan.
But Russia’s hold has tightened on Ashgabat in recent months — partly because of the Russo-Georgian war, which proved to every former Soviet state that Moscow is willing to use force to gain control.
But there was also a recent incident inside Turkmenistan’s capital in which a
possible coup was launched, and the government called on Russia’s help
to crack down on the situation. Turkmenistan
has traditionally been a fairly secure state, so this alleged coup attempt shook the entire Turkmen government to the core. Rumors within the Turkmen government indicate that Western influences
were behind the supposed coup, though there are many doubts as to who was ultimately responsible. Nonetheless, the incident has introverted Ashgabat, which is not wanting to trust (or make deals
with) anyone in the West at the moment — unless, of course, Russia itself were to give a green light.
Though the wheeling and dealing between the United States and former Soviet states is tangled and complicated, negotiations with nearly every country ultimately depend on Russia signing off on
whatever deal is reached. And many of the routes under consideration involve using Russian turf as well. But Washington knows that Moscow is asking a hefty price in order to allow the United States
to use its land or that of its former Soviet states. It is not that Russia wants the United States to fail in Afghanistan — Moscow has no love for Islamists. It is more that this is a rare and
golden opportunity for Russia to leverage the United States’ difficult military position in order to get what it needs
for its own long-term goals.
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