Political Fractures and Geographic Realities in Afghanistan

RUN-OFF ELECTION is set for Nov. 7 in Afghanistan, after the Independent Election Commission determined that President Hamid Karzai garnered less than 50 percent of the vote in the Aug. 20 election, which was plagued by fraud.

Under heavy pressure from the United States and its European allies, Karzai publicly agreed to the run-off with his main rival, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. With just a little more than two weeks before the run-off, however, it remains unclear what the United States, United Nations or anyone else can do to ensure that this election is more free and fair than the last. The first election was an enormous logistical challenge, and a run-off on short notice is likely to be just as challenging, if not more so.

If the run-off is an attempt to restore credibility in Kabul, the chances of that are not looking good. Many Afghans are already highly disillusioned by the widespread fraud that took place in the first-round voting: The United Nations estimates that one in three ballots cast for Karzai were fraudulent. Convincing Afghans to vote again en masse when the harsh winter is approaching and when the Taliban are lying in wait to intimidate them will not be easy. The turnout for the Aug. 20 election was also much lower than previously estimated. According to the Independent Election Commission, it was about 38 percent — much lower than the 60-70 percent widely touted in August. It appears unlikely that Afghanistan will achieve even a 38 percent turnout next time around.

The results of the run-off election are unlikely to matter much in the end. The average Afghan will be far less concerned about who becomes president than about whether the tribal leaders or elected officials — whoever they may be — can actually deliver on promises to provide security, governance and economic welfare. Any government cobbled together in Kabul will be heavily influenced by warlords, severely fractured along ethno-sectarian lines and, in all likelihood, inherently corrupt. A change in faces simply will not alter this.

But Afghanistan’s election dispute is also symptomatic of a broader geographic problem: Afghanistan is a mountainous knot sliced by numerous narrow valleys and surrounded by a wide swath of arid land, an even wider ring of desert and more forbidding mountains.

The arid ring is not capable of supporting a large population in any particular spot, so any force that has some creativity can sweep around the mountain knot relatively easily. In contrast, the mountainous region is perfect for sustaining large numbers of dissidents and rebels, and because it is in the middle of the country it is next to impossible for Afghanistan to consolidate into a coherent, functional state. In both the Soviet and American invasion experiences, the initial “conquering” of Afghanistan took mere weeks, but the occupation bled on for years.

It is the second ring that is the real kiss of death — it separates Afghanistan from the rest of the world, limiting its contact with any military force that could (theoretically at least) use its superior resources and numbers to stabilize the territory.

The bottom line is that, rather than being a coherent country, Afghanistan is a buffer territory in the heart of Asia — one that is surrounded by even more buffer territory, which makes it extraordinarily difficult to pacify in a meaningful way.

Meanwhile, the Afghan election struggle has exposed the battle lines in Washington over the United States’ next steps in the war. As discussed previously, there are a number of fundamental inconsistencies in the counterinsurgency strategy of the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, that cannot be ignored. Some who are in the thick of this debate, such as White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, can see the risk in attaching the administration to a strategy that has slim chances of success. Emanuel said Oct. 18 that the United States must ask itself whether a credible Afghan government to help provide security and government will emerge even if the United States — with more troops and resources — manages to make sufficient progress against the Taliban. In other words, even if the United States makes the investment now, will the Afghans be able to sustain the potential gains?

On the other side of the debate, principals like U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates — who appears to have aligned himself more closely with the McChrystal camp of late — are leaning toward the idea that it might be more politically expedient for President Barack Obama to approve McChrystal’s troop request now, and at least demonstrate that the administration gave the strategy a chance before making the (likely inevitable) decision to draw down. Departing from Emanuel’s line, Gates said that the United States would work with whatever Afghan government emerges. He essentially dismissed the idea that the Afghan election dispute would stall U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.

The debate is ongoing (and you can bet that the Taliban is listening avidly). But the politicians campaigning for a seat in Kabul and officials drafting military plans in U.S. Central Command headquarters both face an inescapable geographic fate in Afghanistan.