For better or worse, the United States is now the center of gravity of the international system. It is the most powerful country politically, economically and militarily. Therefore, any change in political leadership can have a profound effect on every country in the world. This is a fact that is both universally resented and the fundamental reality in the world today.

he U.S.-jihadist war is now nearly three years old. Like most wars, its course has been an unfolding surprise. It is a war of many parts — some familiar, some unprecedented. Like all wars, it has been filled with heroism, cowardice, lies, confusion and grief. As usual, it appears to everyone that the levels of each of these have been unprecedented. In truth, however, very little about this war is unprecedented — save that all wars are, by definition, unprecedented. Only one thing is certain about this war: Like all others, it will end. The issue on the table on the third anniversary is: What is the current state of this war, and how will it end?

Late Friday night, the FBI leaked to the media that an Israeli mole had been caught within the Office of Special Plans (OSP), an analytic and intelligence team inside the Defense Department. Within hours, the suspected mole was identified as Lawrence Franklin, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst seconded to OSP, and a specialist in Iranian affairs. According to the leaks, Franklin had passed classified information to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is a powerful lobbying group on behalf of Israel. In addition, it was made clear that Franklin had been under investigation for a year because he had had extensive contacts with the Iranians and had — in some way — provided Israel with information concerning U.S.-Iranian intelligence.

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr have reached an agreement to end the standoff in An Najaf, putting in place a cease-fire, providing for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the city and the Mehdi Army from the Imam Ali shrine. With al-Sadr’s forces isolated — and with no other Shiite forces coming to their rescue, and the Iranians backing away and making it clear they never supported him and never provided him with assistance — such a deal was almost inevitable.

Of the many things that were included in the 9/11 Commission’s report, perhaps none was more significant in the long run than its criticism of the name the Bush administration has given the war that began on Sept. 11, 2001: the war on terrorism. The report argued that the idea of a struggle against an enemy called “terrorism” was too vague to be meaningful. It argued that the administration should shift away from fighting a “generic” evil and more precisely define the threat — the threat from al Qaeda and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world that “is gathering and will menace Americans and American interests long after” Osama bin Laden is gone.

The U.S. Department of Defense is now activating the Army’s Individual Ready Reserve for combat duty. Given the inherent problems associated with such a move, it is clear that U.S. war planners were caught in a trap: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s “revolution in warfare” has not evolved as expected.

Al Qaeda has launched a multiphase war in Saudi Arabia. The militant group has mid-term operational goals and long-term strategic goals, with an endgame focused on ultimate control over one of the world’s top oil producers.

Attacks against expatriates working in the Saudi Arabian oil patch have accelerated in tempo and intensity during the past several months. If this trend is not reversed — which is not likely — Riyadh will slowly fall from its current position as the kingpin of global energy markets. Oil prices will be both higher and more volatile, Saudi social stability far less guaranteed and OPEC less a force to be reckoned with.

The United States has clearly entered a new phase of the Iraq campaign in which its relationship with the Iraqi Shia has been de-emphasized, while relationships with Sunnis have been elevated. This has an international effect as well. It obviously affects Iranian ambitions. It also helps strengthen the weakening hand of the Saudi government by reducing the threat of a Shiite rising in strategic parts of the kingdom that could threaten the flow of oil. The United States is creating a much more dynamic and fluid situation, but it is also enormously more complicated and difficult to manage.

On Feb. 19, in a piece titled “Ahmed Chalabi and His Iranian Connection,” Stratfor laid out the close relationship Chalabi had with the Iranians, and the role that relationship played in the flow of intelligence to Washington prior to the war. This week, the story of Chalabi, accused of being an Iranian agent by U.S. intelligence, was all over the front pages of the newspapers. The media, having ignored Chalabi’s Iranian connections for so long, went to the other extreme — substantially overstating its significance.