Complications Along the NDN Supply Route

As the blockage of NATO supply lines from Pakistan into Afghanistan continues, the primary alternative lines -- those crossing through former Soviet states -- are also once more threatened. Pakistan started to blockade NATO supplies in November after U.S. airstrikes killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Islamabad is still considering whether to reopen the routes into landlocked Afghanistan. In the meantime, NATO is heavily dependent on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), whose lines run through former Soviet states.

The NDN has various routes, though the main ones run from Russia down through Central Asia, with the majority of NATO supplies into Afghanistan traversing Uzbekistan. In summer 2011, the United States struck a series of deals with Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to expand the use of the NDN. By the end of the year, the NDN was carrying approximately 75 percent of ground cargo (and 40 percent of all cargo) into Afghanistan. After the troubles in Pakistan, the NDN has become a cornerstone for NATO operations in Afghanistan, with plans to heavily increase supplies by mid-2012. However, in running a supply-route network through the former Soviet states, Washington now finds itself affected by those states' political issues, including problems that could threaten the majority of the NDN's lines.

Most recently, Uzbekistan has begun to realize that it can leverage its large role in the NDN to help it prepare for major security challenges on its horizon. Uzbekistan feels it needs a stronger, expanded military and increased security capabilities. As it prepares for a power succession, Tashkent is concerned with the possibility of another uprising in the Fergana Valley. Tashkent is also becoming more worried about a possible security vacuum on its border with Afghanistan when the United States withdraws.

Lastly, Tashkent feels pressured by the recent military buildup in the region by its former ruler, Russia. Uzbekistan has long resisted Russian domination, striving to remain independent from Moscow during the days of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Russia's recent resurgence into Central Asia. Russia sees Uzbekistan as the heart of Central Asia and knows it cannot comfortably control the region until it commands Uzbekistan. Thus far, Tashkent has had little means of resisting Moscow, primarily because Uzbekistan cannot count on an outside power for aid or protection.

Washington's increased reliance on the NDN has given Tashkent an opportunity to try to change this. In agreeing to an expansion of the NDN in summer 2011, Tashkent demanded that sanctions against military aid to Uzbekistan be lifted; Washington complied in September. Tashkent assumed this would naturally lead to negotiations on the provision of military supplies, but Washington never intended to actually transfer weapons to Uzbekistan once the embargo was lifted.

Washington's relationship with Uzbekistan has long been controversial. The State Department and human rights groups have accused the country of a string of human rights violations, many of which were connected to the violent crackdown on the Andijan uprising in 2005. Many within U.S. defense circles are also wary of relying on Uzbekistan: the country has shown a willingness to cut ties, having ejected Washington from its military bases in 2005. Lastly, Washington has been cautious not to cross Russia, which has facilitated the negotiations for an expanded NDN, in its relationships with Central Asian states.

The United States had assumed that lifting sanctions on military supplies to Uzbekistan was a good way to demonstrate improved relations, but Tashkent wants more. According to Stratfor sources, in October the Uzbek government started to threaten the NDN supply route, citing a disagreement over the price of transit. But the sources said that, behind the scenes, Tashkent was really demanding military aid and weapons. 

Providing military aid and weapons to Uzbekistan would not only stir up criticism in Washington among those wary of Uzbekistan, but it would also draw a reaction from Moscow. Still, the United States cannot afford to have the only other major supply route into Afghanistan cut off like the line through Pakistan. So this week, the U.S. State Department waived its assessment on human rights against Uzbekistan, which opened the door for a military aid deal to be struck. Now Washington is proposing to help Uzbekistan by training its border guards, which is similar to a U.S. arrangement with Uzbekistan's neighbor, Tajikistan. The United States says the deal does not arm Uzbekistan in any manner that could facilitate internal crackdowns or be used against Russia. The question now is whether Tashkent will be satisfied with this arrangement, since Uzbekistan knows the deal only addresses a fraction of the country's many security problems.

The more important question is whether Russia sees even this small security tie between the United States and Uzbekistan as a step too far. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake said Wednesday that the military assistance to Uzbekistan would be non-lethal. Moreover, Blake repeatedly confirmed that Washington understood Russia's dominance in the region and that "the Russians are in such a position that they could block what we do if they want." The United States is attempting to balance Uzbekistan's demands for military assistance with Russia's demand that the United States not meddle in Central Asian affairs. A slight miscalculation by the United States in either regard could threaten supply lines into Afghanistan, placing further pressure on the United States in the Afghan war theater.