The release of a new tape by Osama bin Laden is always an important event. The most recent one is particularly important because of the tone it takes. It is far from resigned, but it is a gloomy analysis of al Qaeda’s situation, focusing on the failure of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to resist the United States. Al Qaeda has a great deal to be gloomy about. Events were very much moving in its favor since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. But December was a terrible month for al Qaeda: The United States began to gain control over the insurrection, and the diplomatic situation in the region began to shift in the U.S. favor. Al Qaeda has a problem and is searching for a solution.

On Dec. 22, inspectors detected a case of “mad cow” disease in Washington state. Although the health issues are hardly inconsequential, they are dwarfed by the impact the case will have on U.S.-Canadian relations and global trade negotiations.

The capture of Saddam Hussein is an intelligence success for the United States. It represents a massive effort to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities in Iraq following a period of intelligence failure. Hussein’s capture, therefore, is important not only in itself or in its implications for the guerrillas, but also because it represents a massive and rapid improvement in U.S. intelligence capabilities. It demonstrates that poor intelligence is not inherent in U.S. guerrilla war-fighting; the United States overcame it by identifying the central weaknesses of its opponents. In this case, the central weakness was money — and this was not only a financial weakness, but also a cultural one.

With the passing of the 40th anniversary of the JFK assassination, Stratfor pauses to consider one of the less-examined aspects of the case: Marina Oswald. Her connections to the Soviet intelligence apparatus and odd marriage to Lee Harvey Oswald are seldom factored into any theories surrounding the assassination. However, the facts of the case make it clear that the Soviet government wanted Marina Prusakova and Oswald together in the United States.

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami has quietly announced his recognition of the Iraqi Governing Council and acceptance of the U.S. timeline on the transfer of power in Iraq. The announcement speaks to a partnership that will direct the future course of Iraq. The alliance is of direct short-term benefit to both countries: The United States gains a partner to help combat Sunni insurgents, and Iran will be able to mitigate the long-standing threat on its western border. What is most notable is that, though there has been no secrecy involved, the partnership has emerged completely below the global media’s radar.

U.S. President George W. Bush has hastily convened his war council to decide strategies for the next phase of operations in Iraq. What first must be assessed are the nature, intent and capabilities of the Iraqi guerrilla forces. Imperfect intelligence about this might force the Bush administration to implement strategies based on worst-case-scenario assumptions.

The Cuban missile crisis under President John F. Kennedy holds some apt parallels to the challenges currently facing U.S. President George W. Bush.

Washington is reformulating its war plans in Iraq — something critics of the Bush administration might view as a sign of weakness. The real weakness lies not in that the United States is shifting strategies, but rather that it has taken so long to make adjustments. However, even with a new strategy, it is unclear whether the United States will succeed.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War redefined the Arab-Israeli conflict, the shape of the Arab world and the international economic order — given that the war triggered the Arab oil embargo. It was a significant event in 20th century history. Its origins were in Israel’s victory in 1967 and its overconfidence about its ability to read the Arab mind. Like the Sept. 11 attacks, Oct. 6, 1973, began as a massive intelligence failure. Moreover, the Israeli intelligence failure shaped Arab thinking about the nature of war and the role of intelligence in it. They learned that managing the enemy’s intelligence process compensated for military weakness. It is a lesson that is still very much with us.

In the United States’ open-ended war against al Qaeda and militant Islam, two factors are driving up requirements for the size of the U.S. military. One is the unpredictability surrounding the number of theaters in which this war will be waged in the next two years, and the second is the type of warfare in which the United States is compelled to engage, which can swallow up huge numbers of troops in defensive operations. However, for several reasons, U.S. defense personnel policies have not yet adjusted to this reality.