The United States is involved in its greatest military crisis since the fall of Baghdad a year ago. This is the convergence of two separate processes. The first is the apparent re-emergence of the Sunni guerrillas west of Baghdad; the second is a split in the Shiite community and an internal struggle that has targeted the United States. In the worst-case scenario, these events could have a disastrous outcome for the United States, but there are reasons to think that the worst case is not the most likely at this point.

On March 29, NATO took in seven new member states. The enlargement ensures that the NATO of the future will work as a reliable arm of U.S. policy.

The United States is in the process of picking apart the intelligence and political failures that led up to the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on Sept. 11, 2001. This is an unprecedented process. Normally such reviews occur after the war has ended. In this case, the review was made necessary by the president’s failure to clean house after Sept. 11. That said, the truth of the matter would appear to be more complex than the simplistic charges being traded. The fact is, in our view, the Bush and Clinton policies were far more similar than they were different. We are not quite certain who we have insulted with that claim.

The March 11 attack in Spain indicates that al Qaeda still exists. It also indicates that al Qaeda has a strategy that strikes at the soft underbelly of the U.S. strategy in the war. The political success of the Spanish bombings will encourage al Qaeda and could lead to further militant attempts to work the fault line created in nations that joined the U.S. war in Iraq in an effort to disturb the U.S. alliance.

The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The war in Iraq is reshaping itself, and that is redefining the entire conflict — and returning attention to Saudi Arabia.

The United States is struggling over the question of how U.S. intelligence was so deeply mistaken about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. One of the points that is consistently brought up is that much of the intelligence flowed through the Iraqi National Council, an opposition group led by Ahmad Chalabi. It is now well known that Chalabi’s sources were not ideal. What is less well known is the close, long-term relationship that Chalabi, a favorite of Washington’s, had with Iran. Chalabi, an Iraqi Shiite, was and remains in constant contact with Tehran. We have assumed he was a channel between Washington and Tehran. Given the erroneous intelligence he gave the United States, his relationship with Iran requires careful examination.

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has begun warning his country that if it does not root out al Qaeda, the United States will.

The United States has been less than generous in rewarding its allies for their political and military assistance in the 2003 Iraq war and its aftermath. The U.S. allies might have had high hopes — and made very real sacrifices — but the question for the United States remains: Who needs whom more?

The Saudi government continues to try to regain its footing after shifting relations with the United States brought on by the Sept. 11 attacks and, more concretely, the war in Iraq. The government faces internal pressures from al Qaeda-related militants and also from broader sectors of Saudi society, while external pressures from the United States continue. Several incidents this week exemplify this ongoing balancing act by Riyadh: the awarding of natural gas exploration contracts to four non-U.S. firms, the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition by the United States for 16 Saudis attached to the Saudi Embassy in Washington and the deadly shoot-out with militants in Riyadh on Jan. 29.

The Bush Administration never saw the war in Iraq as either a stand-alone operation or as distinct from the generalized war on the Islamist movement that al Qaeda was part of. As clumsy and, at times, devious as the public presentation of the war was, it had a clear logic. Despite ongoing tactical problems in and around Baghdad, the broad strategic goals of the Iraq campaign are being realized. Therefore, the question now is: What will the next stage of the U.S.-Islamist war look like?