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Three interwoven issues stood at the forefront of the global agenda in our third-quarter forecast: The U.S. election campaign, al Qaeda's attempts to disrupt the election and the redefinition of U.S.-Iranian relations. The U.S. election campaign dominated the world's media through much of the quarter, often focusing on such unlikely issues as the candidates' service records from the 1960s. Meanwhile, al Qaeda-inspired jihadists significantly upped the tempo of operations in Iraq in an effort to weaken support in the United States for President George W. Bush. The Iran issue slipped somewhat, largely because Iran apparently has accepted for now that it is the loser in Iraq, at least in the near term, though the uprising by militants backing Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr offered some brief hope of a resurgent influence.
In the fourth quarter, the U.S. election is once again at the forefront. More importantly, however, will be the aftermath of Nov. 2. Although the polls are showing a dead heat, Bush appears the likely victor, and nations are busy adjusting their policies and actions to that assumed eventuality. In other words, the world is coming around to the idea that the United States will remain the same for another four years.
Regardless of whether Bush is re-elected, he will remain in office past the end of the year -- and will never again have to face re-election. Then the core question becomes: How will Bush act when he is not bound by political constraints? Thus far, he has appeared to a large degree totally indifferent to politics; he never apologizes for his actions, popular or otherwise. So, what does he do when he is NOT running for office?
If Bush loses, he likely will quickly act to clean the global house, increasing military operations around the world in an effort to take the politically unpopular but operationally necessary actions he sees as optimal to bringing about a significant reduction in the threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates. He would be looking for historical justification -- and do his best to settle up accounts. If Bush wins, he will have the luxury of a brief honeymoon while his critics sullenly mull over the outcome. Here, too, Bush might prove anxious to act.
The second term is a heady time for presidents. Having been "vindicated" by the American public, they take off the kid gloves and begin implementing policies rapidly -- changing Cabinets, launching swift operations and embarking quickly on new, or renewed, plans.
For a re-elected Bush, such plans and operations would likely include an invasion of northwest Pakistan to aggressively hunt down Osama bin Laden, a major offensive in Iraq (both of these are already being prepared, if not already being tested) or increasing the pressure on Riyadh to clear Saudi Arabia of militants and their support networks. Bush also can be expected to increase cooperation with the Russians on the Chechnya issue (he hinted at this in the presidential debates), and take a harder line on Europe, while opening a serious strategic dialogue with China.
Should Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry win, the overall thrust of international policies would remain largely unchanged -- al Qaeda would still be a target, U.S. forces would still be deployed abroad -- but the dynamic in Iraq would significantly change. Iraqi jihadists know this, and will continue to burn through resources during October in an attempt to give the impression that U.S. forces are losing in Iraq, and thus to change the political perception in the United States. If the jihadists can be seen as having shifted the dynamic of the U.S. presidential election, they will have won a major moral victory and will be able to parlay that into gains in recruits, support and financing. Should Bush win, however, the foreign jihadists will have consumed major resources for little payoff, while other indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups in Iraq will be reaching understandings with one another and with the United States, at least in part, leaving the jihadists in Iraq increasingly isolated.
For Washington, creating stability in Iraq has never been an option. The fundamental structure leaves two possible outcomes -- total chaos or tyranny. Although violence and instability will continue to exist on the tactical level, should Bush win the election the problem likely will begin to take up less front-page space. On a strategic level, the mission of the United States is not the tactical task given to the soldiers on the ground -- ensuring stability -- but the broader plan of establishing a regional beachhead from which to more strongly influence other regional states. The perception of the goal in Iraq will change after the election.
Ultimately, if Bush wins, and most of the world seems to see this coming, evolutions and policy shifts around the globe will follow. Bush's re-election honeymoon will last until nearly the inauguration, and by then he will have started something elsewhere -- in Iran, Pakistan or even North Korea. If Kerry wins, he has much less room to maneuver. People will expect new foreign policy, but when it remains the same they will be left to interpret the meaning -- and figure out how to react. Furthermore, if he is elected by a narrow margin, he will need to act quickly and decisively on some front in order to demonstrate his fitness to lead.
MIDDLE EAST
Last quarter, Stratfor identified Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia as the three countries of highest geopolitical significance. All three will remain on top during the fourth quarter of 2004 as well. Egypt, given the anticipated change of guard in Cairo and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, will also make headlines during this final quarter.
Saudi Arabia
As predicted, no major militant activity took place during the bulk of the third quarter, but signs indicate jihadists are gearing up for action as fall season sets in. We expect to see jihadist attacks during the month of Ramadan (Oct. 14-Nov. 14), which also includes the run-up to the U.S. elections. More importantly, the kingdom will experience the first phase of its first local elections sometime in the third week of November following the Muslim holiday of Eid al Fitr. This could also elicit militant attacks.
Iraq
Stratfor does not expect the insurgency in Iraq to wane significantly in the next quarter. It has become apparent that the multiple actors in the insurgencies have been able to wage a sustained guerrilla campaign against U.S. and Iraqi forces. The campaign has grown beyond isolated offensive operations into the traditional ebb and flow, peaks and troughs of any conflict. However, there are subtleties that still affect, and will affect, the insurgency.
In the period before and during Ramadan we expect to see a surge in activity by jihadist-type militant groups. The most identifiable of these is the group ostensibly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. These groups have a tendency to carry out operations such as car bombings, suicide bombings and -- most recently -- kidnappings.
During this period, other militant activity (nationalist and Shiite groups) will take a back seat in both notoriety and lethality to jihadist-led activities.
The period immediately following Ramadan in 2003 was met with a lull in guerrilla activity against U.S. forces. In 2004, however, the post-Ramadan period will run directly into Iraq's pre-election turbulence while the country prepares for the planned January 2005 event. This period of heightened political activity will be accompanied by violent activity from all sectors to influence, disrupt or guarantee the elections -- depending on their particular viewpoints.
Significant guerrilla action by nationalist and Shiite militia groups -- such as the Mehdi Army -- will be directed against the United States and their own Iraqi rivals this period. Moreover, there will be a surge in militant activity by jihadist elements. All of this will be seen in scuffles with military forces, attempted assassinations and attempts against Iraqi infrastructure. There especially will be attempts to assassinate Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in order to derail the ongoing political process.
In addition to the fighting, numerous deals and compromises will be made between the myriad power players in post-Hussein Iraq. Shia will cut deals with Sunnis, Sunnis with Kurds, Kurds with Shia, the United States with everyone and the jihadists with none. The talks surrounding these deals will focus on the upcoming elections, which are to take place sometime early in the first quarter of 2005.
Based on the relative success of offensive operations in the insurgent stronghold of As Samarra on the last weekend of the third quarter, the likelihood of another U.S. offensive operation in the Sunni Triangle before 2005 is high. The most likely target cities include Al Fallujah and Ar Ramadi, but the whole of the Sunni Triangle remains squarely in the crosshairs.
Iran
Considering that Iran is heavily engaged in Iraq and has a nuclear program set to claim a portion of the international spotlight in November, it will occupy a center stage in regional and global politics. Tehran managed to avoid much censure in the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution, and its case will be up for review again in November -- possibly the last chance for it to be sent to the U.N. Security Council. This third IAEA round will see intense bargaining involving Iran, the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Russia -- and will intensify U.S.-Iranian relations.
Egypt
Given President Hosni Mubarak's failing health, eyes will shift toward Egypt in the coming months in expectation of moves toward installing his successor. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which enjoys a massive majority in parliament, wields control of the Egyptian military and faces no credible opposition, will witness a more or less smooth transition. The Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) and other secular opposition groups will move to advance their own standing -- not unexpectedly, considering a change of guard is a rare phenomenon in Egyptian politics. The opposition is fully aware this could be a once-in-a-lifetime chance to advance, however marginally. The presidency will be assumed by one of Mubarak's most trusted lieutenants in Cairo's political hierarchy, while the NDP leadership will likely go to Mubarak.
Israeli-Palestinian Issue
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, while continuing to weaken the military capabilities of both secular and Islamist-leaning militant Palestinian groups, will drive political events in the final three months of 2004. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade will continue to try to stage guerrilla and terrorist-style attacks against Israel, while their political leaders will be involved in negotiations among each other and Israel -- albeit indirectly through Egypt to set the stage for Israel's planned pullout from the strip next year. In this regard, Hamas and the Sharon government will also be trying to secure themselves from dissent from within. Sharon will be balancing the demands of his traditional right-wing allies and his plan to withdraw, whereas Hamas will be trying to balance its image as a militant group fighting occupation and a political group trying to gain power in a post-withdrawal Gaza administration.
SOUTH ASIA
Afghanistan and Pakistan will retain their third-quarter positions as the primary drivers of regional events, while India continues to settle in on the new politics of the Congress government.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan's presidential elections will dominate the agenda in the fourth quarter, bringing on significant jockeying for position in the lead up to Election Day. Despite the presence of a vigorous opposition, Stratfor expects Hamid Karzai to remain president of Afghanistan.
Before that day, however, the various warlords who hold power in Afghanistan will play their hands by promoting civil unrest against the Kabul government, perhaps removing Karzai-appointed officials from their provincial posts. In extreme cases, open conflict could erupt between the warlords.
Following Karzai's victory, Stratfor expects Afghanistan to return to normal -- that being a relative term. The warlords will go back to ruling their respective fiefdoms and Karzai will return to being mayor of Kabul. It should be noted, however, that any attempt by Karzai to expand his control to the outlying provinces would unleash the potential for widespread civil war. But Karzai is not a stupid man, and we do not expect this to happen.
Pakistan
As the election season in Afghanistan steps into high gear, so does the pressure on Islamabad to step up the hunt for Islamist militants on its soil. It is decidedly in Pakistan's best interest for the current U.S. administration to remain in power, so Islamabad is likely to aim for high-profile al Qaeda operatives in the country in an effort to nudge Bush along in the polls. Of course, this means walking the tightrope between big results and the domestic uproar it will cause. President Gen. Pervez Musharraf will keep close watch on the U.S. election polls in an effort to keep his equation balanced: The bigger the al Qaeda militant captured the more ground Bush gains; the bigger the catch, however, the more popular resistance to his rule.
Musharraf has played this game fairly well thus far, avoiding both direct U.S. military pressure and public uproar on the home front. Despite a handful of assassination attempts that will not stop either way, he has been able to control his presidency well. That might change after the election, however, if Washington perceives that Islamabad has not done enough in the war on terrorism.
Regardless of the U.S. election results, Bush's virtual blank check, politically speaking, means we could see increased -- likely covert -- military activity in Pakistan by year's end. It is worth noting that a Kerry victory could bring even more military action, as he would need to quickly prove himself a decisive military leader -- and he campaigned on the evils of excluding Pakistan from the U.S. military's focus.
Musharraf, in replacing his two immediate subordinates in the military this quarter, has reshuffled the deck of his top brass in a move that further ensures his security -- and lays the groundwork for a final and formal declaration that he will not step down as military chief anytime soon. Such an announcement will follow a special deal with the moderate Islamist MMA alliance, the largest opposition bloc in parliament.
Cognizant of its vulnerability and that of Musharraf's civil-military hybrid political system, al Qaeda likely will stage attacks in Pakistan to keep the regime off balance -- and thus prevent it from going after the jihadist network too vigorously.
AFRICA
Africa will not see substantial changes in the next quarter regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. However, Washington's anti-terrorism operations in Africa will continue to grow, while international attention to this effort remains minimal.
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