To Stay or Not to Stay

Stratfor:

The U.S. Challenge in Afghanistan (Oct. 20) is the most coherent discussion and comparison I have read on the strategic reasons to stay or not stay in Afghanistan. Now that we are there we must demonstrate our resolve, but the reasons for going in and slogging through to a “win” or a stalemate were not clearly thought through in the beginning. This analysis is well written, logical, thought provoking and useful. Thank you for continuing to provide clear and important worldwide geopolitical and economic analysis and commentary.

-Tim Pasquarelli
Golden, Colorado
United States



Stratfor:

I have seen and read dozens of news pieces in various media concerning losing the fight in Afghanistan — but not one of those articles and news reports describes what “winning” in Afghanistan would look like. Leaving the Iraq adventure aside, even in Viet Nam one had a notion of what winning would be: The North Vietnamese on one side of the boarder and the South on the other with a U.S. “Korea-like” presence in between. But what would “winning” in Afghanistan be like?

-Richard Tedrow
Bethesda, Maryland
United States



Stratfor:

What is the diplomatic and nation-building role of the U.S. State Department and U.S. aid mentioned in this analysis, especially as the military strategy is to draw closer to local populations? What is a very good military strategy article is silent on this point.

-Ted Morse
Reno, Nevada
United States



Stratfor:

Your article on U.S. strategic choices in Afghanistan was excellent. Although, I think you may have overlooked a viable option. Recall that the U.S. did not rout (or force into hiding) the Taliban government through overwhelming conventional forces, but instead relied on disgruntled warlords in the Northern Alliance to provide manpower and intelligence for the 2001-2002 offensive. Similarly, the British controlled India for many years with a relatively small force by giving focused, decisive military support to those warlords who were friendly to the empire. In my opinion, the Bush administration veered off course when it shifted from a “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, to one centered on creating a modern, centrally controlled, democratic nation in a land where none of the critical preconditions exist.

It wouldn’t be easy at this point to adopt a more practical, somewhat cynical, policy in Afghanistan. President Obama obviously cannot simply announce that he is abandoning the Karzi government in favor of unelected local power bosses. Although, reality on the ground can be more nuanced than publicly stated policy and it should be possible to create a dynamic where warlords view U.S. military support as a commodity worth bargaining for.

Eventually, as it did in India, nationalism may grow in Afghanistan to the point where a unified nation is possible. Until then, let’s do what it takes to deny al Qaeda and their kind a safe haven.

-Steven Wynn
Annandale, Virginia
United States



Stratfor:

You seem to have left out another Vietnam-era president — Richard Nixon and his peace with honor theme. Is this not what you are really suggesting in the last paragraph of your article? You also wrote of the methods used in Iraq that are to be reapplied in Afghanistan. Why does this sound so familiar to the enclave strategy used in Vietnam that you seemed to have missed in this analysis? I hate to say it but Vietnam is repeating itself. President Obama is now LBJ; Robert Gates in now Robert McNamara; and Congress is doing the same thing it did in Vietnam — giving up. Is there to be another wall with names of people who died for nothing because we gave up? If we do leave I would love to see your analysis on why ANY member of the U.S. Armed Forces died in Afghanistan — died for what?

-Steven Grigsby
Dupont, Colorado
United States



Stratfor:

You certainly inform your readers of our nation’s foreign policy and military activities in an effective manner. In previous columns you have discussed President Obama’s choices in the Iraqi and Afghani theaters. My own opinion is he has demonstrated little knowledge (and less interest) in foreign policy, and will do NOTHING insofar as possible. His primary focus is in reshaping U.S. domestic policies. As one political wag put it, while we’ve been busy comparing Obama’s foibles to those of former President Jimmy Carter, no one suspected this match up would end up favoring Carter.

-Paul Killinger
Slidell, Louisiana
United States