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By Fred Burton
Recent reports outlining what Time magazine has called the "untold story" of a canceled al Qaeda plot against the New York subway system have excited considerable media hype and public consternation. The account is part of Ron Suskind's new book, The One Percent Doctrine, that was excerpted in the June 26 edition of Time. According to Suskind, al Qaeda developed a "revolutionary new WMD device" that would generate cyanide gas, and these weapons -- which he refers to as "mubtakkar" devices -- were to have been planted on subways by operatives who were in place and preparing to act in early 2003. The plot, however, reportedly was called off by al Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The account of the plot, as outlined by Suskind, raises several issues. First, is there a credible terrorist threat to passenger rail systems in the United States? Second, is there a viable risk that an attack using a mubtakkar device or hydrogen cyanide gas could be carried out? And third, how might such an attack serve the interests of jihadists?
Some of these questions are easy to answer. It long has been our view that the passenger rail system tops the list of soft targets in the United States, and we continue to believe that an attack of some sort will be carried out. And it certainly is possible chemical gases or mubtakkar devices could be used -- with some effect -- in such an attack. However, any description of such devices as a "revolutionary" new threat (or even a particularly deadly one) would be overstating the case. Because of this, it would be highly unlikely that a strategically significant organization with an interest in conducting "spectacular strikes" would opt to use such a weapon. That is not the same as saying that no one could be killed or injured -- but the use of a mubtakkar as described by Suskind in a terrorist strike would likely show more about the perpetrator's weaknesses than his strengths.
Threats to Transportation
Even in light of the security measures taken following the 9/11 attacks, there remain in the United States a great many "soft targets" that are difficult, if not impossible, to completely defend from a terrorist attack. The nation's passenger rail system tops this list. Due to the sheer numbers of people who use the system and the number of stations it encompasses, the security measures necessary to eliminate the possibility of a terrorist strike would all but bring the passenger rail system to a grinding halt.
The risks are particularly relevant in the rail corridor running from Washington, D.C., to New York City. Counterterrorism officials refer to this region as "the X," or target zone, given the symbolic value of both cities and the heavy usage of the rail system there. On average, local transit authorities say, 4.9 million passengers use New York City's trains and subways every weekday, as do 700,000 passengers in Washington.
From a terrorist's perspective, subway and commuter trains provide a dense concentration of potential victims, neatly packaged in a small metal box. When that box is placed inside a concrete tunnel, the confined space can amplify the blast effects of an improvised explosive device (IED). Moreover, there are chances of follow-on casualties as the tunnel fills with smoke and fire; confusion and panic among the passengers is frequently compounded, and people can be trampled or injured by smoke inhalation. Thus, subway and commuter-rail cars not only are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, but from the attacker's perspective, can present a more desirable target than average crowds in other settings.
Obviously, there have been successful attacks against passenger rail systems in recent years. In addition to the strikes in London and Madrid, there have been several thwarted plots touching on the New York subway system. Among these were the July 1997 plot involving Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil, who were arrested in the early hours of the day on which they had planned to execute their attack, and the 2004 plot involving Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay.
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