Red Alert Intelligence Guidance: Russia Halts Military Operations (Free Access)

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The crater from a Russian shell blast in Gori, Georgia

Editor’s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.

The Russians have announced a halt to military operations. This is in large part because they have achieved their political goals — they have demonstrated their ability to carry out a complex military operation, and they have shown that the United States and Europe cannot respond militarily. What the Russians want to do now is replace Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. If they occupy Tbilisi, they make him a martyr. If, however, they simply halt operations, in due course recriminations will begin inside Georgia over his decision to attack South Ossetia and his lack of preparedness for the consequences.

The Russians also know that a prolonged occupation of Georgia would inevitably result in guerrilla warfare against the occupying forces. The Russians were bled by the Chechens, and they do not want to risk a long, draining occupation of Georgia. Their goal was not to end Georgian sovereignty; rather, it was to force the Georgians to readjust their foreign policy away from the United States and toward Russia. Regardless of personnel changes, Georgia will be enormously more careful in its actions in the future, and much less confident of its relationship with the United States.

Ending the war will not be as easy as turning off a switch. Russian troops are in Georgia, and they are being attacked by Georgian defenders. Calling for a cease-fire and imposing it are two different things. The danger for the Russians now is that their decision to halt operations and withdraw might not be implemented because of low-grade attacks complicating the situation. If the Russians want a complete cessation of hostilities before they withdraw, withdrawal can be postponed indefinitely, and Russia can become an occupying power engaged in low-intensity conflict for an extended period of time. The thing to watch for now is whether Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s announcement will be implemented even in the face of conflict.

We think it is likely that the Russians do indeed want to withdraw. The Russians have achieved the desired psychological effect with the West, shattered Georgian self-confidence and set in motion recalculations by other countries in the region. The pacification of Georgia was not on their agenda. But agendas change, and the question now is whether the Russians have the self-discipline to disengage, or whether they will now succumb to the worst danger of war: mission creep.

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