Protests in Bahrain Turn Violent

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A Shiite anti-government protester holds a banner reading 'no dialogue until the regime falls' in Manama, Bahrain

Summary

Bahraini media reported that 41 members of Bahraini security forces were injured in violent clashes with anti-government protesters Jan. 24. The escalation of what had been mostly peaceful demonstrations is notable, and it follows similar events in restive Shiite areas of Saudi Arabia. Though the reasons behind the violence are currently unclear, it does coincide with recent calls for a change in tactics by opposition leaders and intensifying Iranian rhetoric toward its Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors.

Analysis

Anti-government protests in Bahrain, which have been occurring regularly since February 2011, appear to be intensifying. Most recently, Bahrain's Information Affairs Authority reported that 41 members of Bahraini security forces were injured Jan. 24 during clashes with protesters at unauthorized demonstrations throughout the country. Public Security Chief Maj. Gen. Tariq al-Hassan said protesters in several Shiite villages blocked roads and threw Molotov cocktails at security forces. Saudi security forces have seen a similar violent escalation in protests since October 2011 in the Shiite-majority Eastern Province, which they have blamed alternately on Shiite protesters and "unknown assailants."

The violence directed at security forces during these clashes is noteworthy; Shiite and occasionally Sunni opposition groups have been peacefully protesting for reforms for almost a year, but recently opposition leaders have begun calling for an escalation in tactics.

Calls for Escalation

Protests of varying degrees of organization and participation have occurred several times a week in Bahrain since February 2011. Some of these are organized by specific opposition groups, some begin as funeral processions that transform into demonstrations and others are more spontaneous and have no real leadership. However, these demonstrations have yielded almost no significant political reforms, prompting opposition leaders to begin calling for an escalation. For example, al-Wefaq, which has typically applied for and received permission from the government to hold rallies, has begun to hold them even when rejected.

In a more extreme case, one of the main opposition groups, the February 14 Movement, had been carrying out peaceful but disruptive actions to draw attention to its cause, such as instructing its members to drive their cars on specific highways to cause heavy traffic. These tactics gradually evolved to become more spectacular, with the traffic protests eventually turning into calls for protesters to drop debris on highways and in intersections and light the debris on fire. Then in the week preceding the Jan. 24 events, the February 14 Movement began posting militant messages on its website, such as instructions for escalating protests by attacking security forces and for constructing and throwing Molotov cocktails. These were accompanied by well-made illustrations depicting protesters attacking security forces and setting fires.

Religious opposition leaders have also heightened tensions. Prominent Shiite cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, who counts among his followers members of the February 14 Movement and other opposition groups, gave a sermon Jan. 20 instructing protesters to "crush" people who are seen abusing women -- likely a veiled reference to Bahraini police, who reportedly have abused female protesters.

These escalations appear to be aimed at provoking security forces into a harder crackdown, which has galvanized potential protesters in the past. Thus far, the Bahraini regime has been able to keep protests from gaining traction by employing a variety of tactics including arresting key opposition figures and activists, dispersing crowds with tear gas and rubber bullets and shutting down roads leading into Manama to keep rural protesters away from important or symbolic infrastructure such as the Lulu Pearl Roundabout, the site of the original protests. Occasionally, if the regime needs a bit more support, GCC Peninsula Shield forces are deployed to Manama to pre-empt possible clashes.

Possible Iranian Influence

Iran has recently intensified its rhetoric when discussing its Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors, threatening to employ its levers in Bahrain to further incite anti-government protests. Senior Iranian military commander Brig. Gen. Mirfeisal Baqerzadeh told Iran's Fars News Agency on Jan. 23 that over the next year the revolution in Bahrain will enter a new phase of "military, guerilla and irregular operations." Whether or not it has effective proxies in the Arabian Peninsula, Iran benefits from such statements, which allow it to intimidate its Arab adversaries and potentially draw them into negotiations. However, the timing between this increased Iranian rhetoric and the stark escalation in Bahraini and Saudi protests is notable. Although Iran faces many limitations to its ability to wield its patronage networks in the Arabian Peninsula, Iran having a hand in the recent escalation is not out of the question.

If these violent actions continue or escalate, it could mark a dramatic shift in the course of the Bahraini unrest. Such developments are key, as they could lead to discovery of who is driving the escalation, how much of the Bahraini population supports their ideology and the extent of external influence in the unrest.