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Several banned Kashmiri militant groups are resurfacing in major Pakistani cities, Pakistan’s Dawn News reported April 25. Members of prominent groups like Harkat ul Mujahideen, al Badr, Harkat-e-Islami, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Hizbul Mujahideen reportedly are setting up new offices, changing their names, putting up flags and posters, holding large rallies, and delivering sermons in mosques to publicize the groups’ activities. The news channel specified that Harkat ul Mujahideen has relocated its base from Islamabad to the city outskirts in Rawalpindi and is considering renaming itself Ansar-ul-Ummah, while Jaish-e-Muhammad is still deciding on a name change. The report also claimed that most of this activity is taking place in the port city of Karachi, and that the groups probably will be reactivated by mid-May.
These groups are seizing the opportunity to come out from hiding while the newly elected Pakistani government remains in flux. But this apparent revitalization of Pakistan’s Kashmiri militant groups probably also is taking place with a wink and a nod from the country’s military and security apparatus. To understand the drivers behind this strategy, Pakistan’s history of militant management must be examined more closely.
The Birth of Pakistani Militant Networks
Straddling the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and India, Pakistan is located in a strategic stretch of the Islamic belt. The country’s Islamist-nationalist foundation combined with a mountainous and sparsely populated periphery creates a natural hotbed for Islamist militancy that Islamabad has long made use of in its dealings with its neighbors.
India has been Pakistan’s primary threat since their 1947 partition. After Pakistan lost its eastern foothold in 1971 with the independence of Bangladesh, it became all the more imperative for Pakistan to bring Afghanistan under its control. There existed a real fear in Islamabad that India would bolster Pashtun nationalist movements in Afghanistan, which could reclaim Pashtun territory in Pakistan and thereby put a stranglehold on Islamabad. As a result, Pakistan must use its ties among the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan to downplay nationalism, play up Islamism, and ensure a Pakistan-friendly government is in control of Kabul. This explains the Pakistani bid to undermine the Indian- and Soviet-friendly Marxist regime in the 1980s, and later bring the Taliban to power in 1996.
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