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During the 1990s, organized crime expanded into all sectors of the Russian economy, government and society, sustaining Russia at first but eventually threatening the sovereignty of the state. Russian President Vladimir Putin — eager to consolidate power and resources under his own control — has reined in some aspects of Russian organized crime and has weakened the influence of the oligarchs. However, considering Russia’s historical dependence on organized crime and its recent proliferation throughout the world, organized crime will remain a fixture in Russian society for some time to come.
A Brief History of the Russian Mafia
Russia’s history, like that of many other nations with such stature, is largely cyclical. Russia’s historical cycle runs roughly as follows: Catastrophe strikes the centralized state and the social order is shattered; a “white rider” comes along to pick up the pieces and restore power to the state, only to come up short and yield to a “dark rider” willing to do whatever is necessary regardless of moral implications; and an era of decline follows until the next catastrophe strikes and the cycle begins anew.
As the power of the centralized state changes during the cycle, other actors — whether internal or external — prey upon Russia when it is weak and cooperate with Russia when it is strong. Organized crime is just as beholden to Russia’s historical cycle, with its power inversely related to the power of the state. When the Russian state is in a crisis, organized crime spreads and becomes the functioning arbiter of state affairs. Once power is restored to the state, organized crime never fully disappears but recedes into the background, usually cooperating to some degree with the state, until another catastrophe hits and allows it to expand again.
The modern era of organized crime in Russia began with the 1917 revolution. Czar Nicholas II was overthrown, creating a period of instability during which organized crime picked up. During the revolution, food and other basic goods were scarce, and organized crime sought to provide them — for a price. When Vladimir Lenin (the white rider of that era) took over, he asserted the central government’s power and attempted to subdue organized crime, though he was largely unsuccessful. His successor, Joseph Stalin, cracked down even harder, sending criminals to the infamous Soviet gulags. Organized crime continued to survive under Stalin, but only the best-connected criminal bosses enjoyed protection from Stalin. Upon Stalin’s death, 8 million prisoners were released from the gulags, and the vory v zakone (“thieves in law”) — as organized crime was known in prison — were released upon Soviet society. By the time Leonid Brezhnev was in office and overseeing an economically feeble Soviet Union, organized crime had infiltrated the highest ranks of the Communist Party. The vory were allowed to buy goods outside of the Soviet Union and operate smuggling routes in return for supplying the Communist Party with foreign luxury items, which were given as rewards for good behavior within the party.
By the 1990s, Russia found itself again in a crisis of state authority that nurtured the expansion of organized crime. After the Soviet system collapsed, organized crime exploded, filling every state and nonstate void. Since laws concerning property and asset control were not enforced following the collapse, those who took advantage of the situation acted with impunity. Organized criminals’ internal and external connections from their days of operating under the Soviets ensured they gobbled up the oil, gas, mineral and telecommunications industries; their smuggling routes (later to become supply chains) let them exploit these assets for financial gain. The organized crime bosses and their colluding political contacts from the Soviet era helped to create the enormously powerful oligarchs of Russia’s chaotic post-Soviet era. Some oligarchs were former politicians, some were former criminals and some were well-connected businessmen operating in the gray area. The oligarchs worked with organized crime, either because they had to in order to conduct business or because crime was their business strategy.
Following the collapse, basic government functions — such as social security, the pension system, some electrical grids, dispute settlement and the distribution and protection of property — either disappeared or were hopelessly inefficient. Government workers were woefully underpaid or even cut from the payrolls. Thousands of ex-KGB officers left the state and joined the organized crime network. This increased the amount of security that Russian organized crime could provide and also gave it access to state assets controlled by the KGB. Without a functioning state police to ensure the well-being of Russia’s citizens and their property, the oligarchs were left to their own devices but — along with their organized criminal associates — profited from the void the Soviet Union left behind. In 1994, then-President Boris Yeltsin called Russia “the biggest mafia state in the world,” referring to “the superpower of crime that is devouring the state from top to bottom.”
Enter the white rider again. By the time Putin came to power in 1999, the organized crime world and the oligarchs were seriously threatening the Russian state. First, organized crime was arguably the most stable Russian institution. Where the state was ineffective in settling disputes, enforcing laws and providing security, organized crime was imposing its own version of justice. Second, state assets such as energy, minerals, telecommunications and transport networks were under the control of the oligarchs. Since 1999, Putin has made it a point to adjust the balance between organized crime and the state. To do this, he has asserted control over the state to reduce corruption and break up the oligarchs’ hold over state assets; and now he is looking to increase the power of state security forces and reduce the power of organized crime. Organized crime is far too entrenched in Russia ever to go away completely, and Putin knows this. However, Putin — who will still be powerful as prime minister when his successor Dmitri Medvedev is sworn in as president — will continue his campaign to strengthen the state and weaken its competition.
Smuggling Routes and International Connections
Russia’s unique geographical position is both a boon and a curse for those operating within the country. Russia is at the intersection of Asia, Europe and the Middle East, giving it access to some major markets and producers. The country’s sheer size and position mean that any agent operating within Russia, be it organized crime, railroads or the Federal Security Service, can access a number of strategic areas while staying relatively close to “home base.” On the other hand, its expansiveness also means that Russia is paranoid about its vulnerability on many fronts.
The Russian mafia has been able to take advantage of Russia’s position in the Eurasian heartland much as the Soviet Union did in the 20th century. The Russian mob (concentrated in Moscow) is able to work with suppliers and clients in East Asia and the opium-rich Golden Crescent through the former Soviet states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It can smuggle goods to and from the Middle East and send commodities to and from the European and American markets through ports on the Baltic and White seas. However, its sheer size, location and harsh conditions make Russia difficult to navigate. Any entity that seeks to control this land mass must be very well organized and have a wealth of resources to coordinate on all fronts. Russian organized crime’s resurgence speaks volumes to the effectiveness of its network and its access to resources.
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