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Editor’s Note: This is the third in a series of analyses on the feasibility and relevance of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, one can hardly discuss nuclear weapons in the 21st century without also talking about terrorism. Yet Stratfor has deliberately left this aspect of the nuclear dynamic until later in our series on the subject because, while we do not categorically rule it out, we also do not view the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists or other nonstate actors as a likely threat. As a class, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons present significant challenges for development — challenges compounded by considerations unique to nonstate actors.

Stratfor has repeatedly pointed out that chemical and biological weapons are expensive, are difficult to use and have proven to be largely ineffective in real-world applications. A comparison of the ineffectiveness of the Aum Shinrikyo chemical and biological attacks in Tokyo with the effectiveness of the March 2004 jihadist attacks in Madrid clearly demonstrates that explosives, pound for pound, are far cheaper, easier to use and ultimately more efficient at killing people. The failure by jihadists in Iraq to use chlorine effectively in their attacks also underscores the problem of effectively using improvised chemical weapons.

These cases are also illustrative of why CBRN weapons are not necessarily “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). There is an important and stark distinction between these two terms, which are too often viewed as synonymous. The former, CBRN, is a class of devices and weapons that are used to inflict harm. The latter, WMD, is a measure of potential lethality. The anthrax attacks in the United States in the wake of 9/11 used a CBRN agent but could hardly have been classified as attacks utilizing WMD.

The same is true of radiological weapons. Only nuclear devices and weapons — if they are designed properly and sufficiently fueled — are categorically WMD. Even the most rudimentary device could potentially devastate the heart of a major urban area.

Perhaps the most important lesson of 9/11 for nonstate actors was that methods of attack that are less difficult to develop and execute than nuclear attacks (such as using large, fully fueled commercial airliners as guided missiles) can achieve WMD results. Though a nuclear or radiological attack is certainly an attractive prospect for groups like al Qaeda, the ability of nonstate actors to actually develop or acquire the means to undertake such an attack is an essential consideration in evaluating the threat.

Radiological Dispersal Devices

A radiological dispersal device (RDD), also called a “dirty bomb,” is simply a device that disperses radiation. Depending on the motives of those planning the attack, such a device could be a low-key weapon that surreptitiously releases aerosolized radioactive material, dumps out a finely powdered radioactive material or dissolves a radioactive material in water. Such methods would be intended to slowly expose as many people as possible to the radiation. Alternatively, even a low-tech improvised explosive device could hypothetically be used to disperse a radiological isotope (though it may not be the most efficient means — and the explosive itself may be the most lethal part of the entire apparatus). However, unless large amounts of a very strong radioactive material are used, the effects of such an exposure are more likely to be long-term rather than sudden and dramatic: people dying of cancer years later rather than acute radiation poisoning at the time of the attack.

Radioisotopes appropriate for such devices — even the most dangerous — have legitimate medical, commercial and industrial uses. The International Atomic Energy Agency has warned that such radioisotopes are readily available to virtually any country in the world — and they are almost certainly not beyond the reach of even moderately capable nonstate actors. And they can be deadly. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a tiny radiotherapy capsule of cesium chloride salt was accidentally broken open, resulting in four deaths due to sustained exposure and $20 million in damages and cleanup costs.

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