Free Preview of Members-Only Content
To view the requested intelligence, you must be a Stratfor.com member.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared May 8 that the Shiite militant group’s communications network is its most important weapon, and that the government’s decision to target the network was tantamount to a declaration of war. As Nasrallah spoke, Beirut was swarming with Hezbollah supporters flashing victory signs, waving flags, burning tires, blockading roads and attacking rival government forces with everything from rocks to mortar fire.
Nasrallah was referring to a decision made by members of the Western-backed Lebanese government’s Cabinet two days earlier. After eight hours of deliberation, the Cabinet announced to the public that Hezbollah’s communications network was illegal and represented an attack on the country’s sovereignty.
The government crossed a red line when it decided to go after Hezbollah’s communications network. In Hezbollah’s view, its communications technology is just as essential for the group’s survival as its missiles. With the help of Iranian electronic engineers, the group has built an expansive network that stretches across Beirut and through the Bekaa Valley to the south along the Israel-Lebanon border. Indeed, during the 2006 summer conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, Hezbollah was effective in preventing Israeli electronic warfare (EW) units from jamming its networks south of the Litani River and even reportedly had the assets in place to jam parts of Israel’s radar and communications systems.
The Lebanese government is very aware of what it means to single out Hezbollah’s communication network. However, the government faces a daunting task in attempting to dismantle the Shiite group’s communications network. This analysis explores the intricacies of Hezbollah’s communications technologies, the EW tactics the group and its opponents face and the sheer difficulty of taking the system apart.
Hezbollah’s Tactical Communications Network
Land Lines/Hard Lines
Of the telecommunications networks available to Hezbollah, land line systems are among the simplest and cheapest to construct. Primarily, land line networks are constructed using either copper wires or fiber optic cable, the former being very vulnerable to EW practices (such as tapping and jamming) and the latter almost immune.
Copper wiring, the core material in traditional wiring applications, acts as an electrical conductor and transmits information via electrical signals. This design, however, allows anyone who discovers the cable to easily open it, splice in a connection and intercept communications taking place across the line.
But this vulnerability has not dissuaded Hezbollah from using it, at least in part, within their greater communications network. In fact, in addition to using the current national land line systems, Hezbollah has for several years constructed its own network of copper land lines and cables. Much of the organization’s network was laid alongside national phone companies’ and communications firms’ cables and wires, in an effort to take advantage of existing infrastructure and ensure a degree of security for the network itself. The remaining portions that were not built in proximity to the national networks extend throughout the country, connecting disparate offices and outposts to the centralized network. However, this portion of the land line system should not be viewed as a primary communication tool due to its vulnerabilities; it is best considered a secondary or emergency communication system.
The other type of land line communication network is constructed out of fiber optic cables and, because of the cables’ properties and operating principles, quickly is becoming one of the kinds of networks Hezbollah uses most frequently. Unlike copper and other types of cables, fiber optic cables are not vulnerable to electromagnetic interference; some have even claimed that it is impossible to tap a fiber optic cable and intercept data, but this is only partially true.
The basis for this claim is rooted in the underlying design of the cables and technology, which transmit data via pulses of light rather than electrically. This renders them immune to electromagnetic interference, and that alone is of considerable benefit. However, their real worth is that they can be incredibly difficult to tap into.
There are two possible procedures to choose from to attempt to tap a fiber optic cable. The first of these is locating a coupling point between two strands of cable. Once the strands are detached, a signal interceptor can be inserted and data potentially can be captured. The second method relies upon physically severing the cable, inserting the interceptor, and reattaching the two ends. Regardless of which method is employed, a sharp drop in optical power transmission will occur. In a robust network the cables’ data stream would be rerouted automatically, but will still draw attention. Furthermore, when an interceptor is inserted, it has to absorb or divert some of that light in order to obtain the data being sent. This ultimately causes a noticeable decrease in optical power. If these two events take place in sequence, network technicians can be almost certain that someone has deliberately tampered with the cable. And even if the intruders were able to avoid detection, there is the issue of being able to decrypt the data stream and sort out relevant information, which is difficult even if the amount of data is fairly limited.
Though the process is difficult, many organizations and governments — including the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan — are known to have successfully intercepted data or engaged in cyber attacks through hijacked fiber optic cable connections. Although limited thus far, Hezbollah has also been able to engage in fiber optic cable tapping, enabling data interception and the hijacking of Internet and communication connections. All this being said, however, fiber optics will continue to be one of the most secure forms of communication.
Mobile and Satellite Phone Networks
Within Hezbollah’s communication infrastructure, the use of mobile phones is highly prevalent. Used for everything from battlefield communication to general organizational communication, the mobile phone is critical to Hezbollah’s ability to function efficiently.
| Stratfor Members, please log in at the top left hand corner |
