
LOUAI BESHARA/AFP/Getty Images
A poster of Syrian President Bashar al Assad above pro-regime protesters in Damascus on Jan. 26
Summary
Armed groups on Jan. 26 took control of Douma, a suburb about 10 kilometers (6 miles) outside Damascus. A government official implied that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad might be willing to negotiate a cease-fire with rebels as it did in Zabadani on Jan. 18. Events on the surface seem to be turning against the Alawite regime, and the opening of such negotiations would be a critical point in the 10-monthlong Syrian uprising.
Analysis
Hussein Makhlouf, the governor of Damascus governorate, said Jan. 26 that armed groups had taken control of parts of Douma, a Damascus suburb located some 10 kilometers (6 miles) outside the capital, and that Syrian authorities had already begun a dialogue with them. Speaking to a crowd of Arab League observers before they headed out to inspect another Damascus suburb called Irbin, Makhlouf added that authorities were using "the same approach as in Zabadani, so the same scenario will happen." This statement appears to be a tacit admission by a senior Syrian government official that the Alawite regime is open to a cease-fire with the rebels in Douma, as it was in Zabadani on Jan. 18.
Makhlouf's description of the ongoing dialogue seems to contradict activists' and residents' Jan. 26 claims that the Syrian army had begun a siege on Douma that same day, conducting house-to-house raids and allegedly clashing with army defectors. Although cease-fire negotiations and a siege could occur concurrently, no activists, residents or Free Syrian Army (FSA) officials have mentioned a potential cease-fire in Douma. While no Arab League monitors were able to enter Douma on Jan. 26, the independent journalists who did had already left by the time the Syrian security forces moved in, meaning the information -- as is almost always the case in Syria -- is impossible to verify.
The cease-fire in Zabadani was a psychological pivot in the 10-monthlong Syrian uprising. For the first time, the Syrian government conceded, if only temporarily, territory seized by a rebel force. Although a superior force could re-enter Zabadani with relative ease and quickly take back the town, a week has passed without the Syrian army having done so; the question is why? Likewise, if portions of Douma have in fact been taken over by armed rebels (as in Zabadani), the next question is whether Damascus truly plans to negotiate a similar cease-fire with the FSA in a town only six miles from the capital. The opening of such negotiations could mark a turning point for the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
The continued presence of Arab League monitors in the country could explain the regime's apparent display of restraint, especially in Douma. The regime may fear that conducting a bloody crackdown in a town so close to the capital, where many of the monitors are currently congregated, would generate widespread condemnation of the regime that would turn the international community against the al Assad regime completely. In this scenario, the regime could negotiate now and strike once the monitors leave. However, the recent rift between Damascus and the Arab League -- the Gulf states leading the effort to increase Arab pressure on Syria -- may not sufficiently explain this scenario.
On Jan. 22, the Arab League called for al Assad to step down and hand over power to his vice president. Shortly thereafter, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states announced that they were withdrawing their monitors from the Arab League delegation. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor al-Thani also plans to visit the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 30 to talk about increasing the pressure on al Assad; the Arab League secretary-general will accompany him on the trip. Al Assad knows that any appeal to the U.N. Security Council will fail to gain traction so long as Moscow stands on the side of the Syrian regime. However, al Assad also knows that he has already lost the support of many Arab states, just as former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi did in March 2011. Other than resigning, it is highly unlikely he can remedy his image in these states' eyes, no matter what course of action he takes.
With the Syrian government now talking about negotiating a cease-fire in Douma, and with Zabadani remaining under rebel control, circumstances appear to be moving against al Assad, who seems to be reaching out to the opposition. This situation raises a couple of key questions: Are al Assad's forces capable of retaking these areas? And if Syrian troops can easily retake Zabadani, why have they not? Al Assad appears weak right now. If he is not weak, he will soon act to prove it. Essentially, the Syrian regime's response to reports of rebels taking control of Douma brings the Syrian uprising to a defining moment.
Compromise happens when neither side can impose its will -- and when each is afraid of becoming weaker. A temporary cease-fire is one thing, but negotiations could end up empowering the opposition, which could try to replicate successful tactics and pressure the regime into making piecemeal concessions. The regime can keep reverting to military force, but after 10 months that has not been enough.
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