Agenda: With George Friedman on the Visegrad Group
Video Transcript:
In this week's Agenda, Stratfor CEO George Friedman discusses current tensions in Europe, NATO, Russia and the Visegrad Group.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Tensions in Europe are not just about finance and sovereign debt. There are issues about and within NATO, and now a key group of countries that were once part of the Warsaw Pact (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) have formed their own battle group. They are concerned about their future.
Welcome to Agenda with George Friedman.
George, financial stability is top of the European agenda right now, but there are other fault lines developing.
Well, certainly there are more than one fault line. The entire problem is rooted in the fact that the EU is in very serious trouble not merely because of debt but because the structure of the EU itself is faulty. I mean, the structure of the EU is simply this: You have a series of developing countries whose wage advantage ought to give them positive balance of trade. Instead, they're faced with the largest, second-largest exporter in the world, Germany, who's pumping product into them. This leaves them very off-balance and vulnerable. But more than that, the Germans are the ones who have become less and less comfortable and less and less enamored by the EU, and are engaged in a serious flirtation with Russia, on whom they are dependent with natural gas, on whom they are providing investment capital and more importantly, technology. And what emerged this week was that the countries that historically distrust both Germany and Russia, which are called the Visegrad countries after the place where they all met back in 1991 (this is Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), announced that it was their intention to field their own battle group outside the structure of NATO, some vaguely part of the EU, and to create a military force under their own control, independent of the Germans, independent of the Russians, and this represents a historic shift. It is driven by the financial crisis, it is driven by the underlying problems of the European Union, but ultimately it is driven by a distrust of Germany and a distrust of Russia and a desire to be stronger by themselves.
So, what, precisely, is a battle group?
That's not clear at all. The definition of a battle group is obviously a group that can do battle. It's not clear how large this group is going to be. It's not clear exactly when it will be fielded, although they said it in 2016, but what's really important here is not exactly what this battle group is going to be able to do, it is that the Visegrad countries -- the New Europe if you will, as it's called sometimes -- has stepped over a threshold. Their thinking, ever since they became independent of the Soviet Union, ever since the collapse of communism, was that their security rested within the framework of NATO and the EU. With this decision however tentative, however small it might be at this point, they have stepped away at least from the idea that NATO by itself can defend their interests to the idea that they're going to have to take responsibility for their interests, and this is a sea change in their thinking. The idea to them back in 1991 that anything other than NATO would be the basis of their national security would have been unthinkable, and they have now moved to the unthinkable. What exactly it means, how large it will be, will evolve over time, but a threshold has been crossed.
And coincidentally, Russia's President Dmitri Medvedev has been talking about the idea of a new Cold War developing if the United States persists with a missile defense system in Poland.
Well, it's very difficult to imagine a new Cold War because Russia is not a global power. The Russians during the Cold War had forces in Cuba, had forces in West Africa; they were a global power plus a nuclear power. Russia is now a regional power and as a regional power it can create serious problems along its frontiers, but we have to distinguish that from what happened in the Cold War. That said, the Russians have distrusted the United States in particular, NATO in general, for a very long time. This is not a new statement. This is a feeling on the part of the Russians that the United States is engaged in an attempt to once again contain Russia, that is, to surround it with alliances, and undoubtedly they look at the Visegrad coalition as American-engineered. I don't think it was. I think quite the contrary. It was engineered because the Americans were not taking an action, and the Poles in particular felt obligated to take the leadership position. But, I mean, there is an underlying tension between the United States and Russia that is substantial, and the Russians are doing everything they can to split the Europeans away from the Americans, particularly the most powerful European country -- Germany -- and are doing a pretty good job of it. Let's also remember that Medvedev appears to be having some sort of competition with Putin. Putin is the one who appears to be stronger on national security issues. Medvedev undoubtedly wants to appear stronger for a public that really cares about these issues and so for internal consumption he made this statement. But that doesn't gainsay the fact that this was significant too.
The Poles take over the EU presidency at an extraordinarily difficult time. EU countries are squabbling, the euro is facing another crisis point, Germany is getting closer to Russia, France has other things on its mind. What kind of agenda can we expect from the Polish presidency?
Well, I have to be honest that I don't understand what a six-month presidency is supposed to do, or how its agenda has any meaning. These are symbolic rotations. The basic decisions in Europe are not being made in Brussels. They are being made in Berlin, they are being made in Paris, they are being made in Warsaw, in the national capital. I mean, what you have again is nationalism in Europe beginning to become very significant. That said, I mean, the Polish presidency has the opportunity to raise some issues, and he will raise the issues of the fact that NATO is firstly unable to carry out its primary mission because it's simply too many of the countries lack the military force able to do it, and secondly there is no consensus in NATO as to what that mission should be. We have seen during the Libyan crisis a very interesting and significant split between France and Germany, two countries that have been together, aligned for a very long time, where the French very badly wanted to go to Libya and the Germans equally badly did not want to have anything to do with Libya, and so they went their own ways. And I think the Polish concern is really the fraying of NATO and the state of its preparedness, but on the other hand I mean, what can you do in a six-month presidency except raise issues. I mean, the EU is designed not to be able to function very well with this kind of rotation.
George, thanks very much. George Friedman there, ending Agenda for this week. I'm Colin Chapman. Thanks for joining us and until the next time, goodbye.
