Pakistan, India: Putting the Crisis in Context

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Birds fly over a fire at the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, India

STRATFOR has mentioned the near-nuclear crisis along the Indo-Pakistani border in 2002 after the 2001 attack on India’s Parliament. However, there are circumstantial differences between then and now — particularly in the internal politics of Pakistan, India and the United States.

STRATFOR has called attention to the near-nuclear crisis that broke out along the Indo-Pakistani border in early 2002 following the December 2001 Parliament attack in India to emphasize the gravity of the situation we are now facing. While such a historical parallel can be drawn, we also need to be mindful of the circumstantial differences between then and now, and how the internal politics of the main players in this crisis — India, Pakistan and the United States — are locking each country into positions that run a high likelihood of producing another crisis on the Indo-Pakistani border.

On Dec. 13, 2001, Pakistani-backed militants belonging to the Islamist militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed carried out a major attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi that killed 14 people, prompting India to mobilize and deploy forces to the Pakistani border in Kashmir and Punjab in a massive military build-up seven days after the attack. Pakistan then responded by moving forces from its western border with Afghanistan, where Pakistani forces under pressure from the United States were battling al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, to the border with India. By late December, both countries had moved ballistic missiles closer to the border, and artillery and mortar exchanges were taking place on both sides of the border in Kashmir. The situation soon reached a near-nuclear climax that was eventually calmed in October 2002 with the help of U.S. intervention.

But a lot has changed since 2002.

Let us begin with Pakistan. In 2002, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf was in full control of the country’s government and military. The jihadist insurgency was being fought on Afghan soil, and though Musharraf would soon be dodging assassination attempts left and right, there was no real insurgency to speak of inside Pakistan’s borders. Command and control within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency was still fairly strong, and the political opposition was busy bickering among themselves outside of the government. Though Pakistan was coming under heavy pressure by the United States to cooperate on the counterterrorism front, it was still on stable enough footing to have options in dealing with threats across its eastern border.

Pakistan today is quite different. A weak and extremely fractured civilian government is now in charge of the country, with a political leadership that is sorely lacking in credibility. The military and ISI are locked into a battle with the civilian government over who controls policy (especially concerning national security and foreign relations), with the civilian government making repeated (and failed) attempts to impose control over the military and intelligence establishment. The Pakistani economy is on the brink of bankruptcy and only just recently secured an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan with politically explosive conditions attached. It was only a couple of weeks ago when the Pakistani government was barely able to cover its bills for the month and had to swallow the IMF’s bitter remedies for economic recovery, though Pakistan still needs about twice as much funding to reboot its economy. The IMF remedies include things like slashing defense spending — which is nearly impossible, given the military tensions building up with India right now — and phasing out subsidies — a dangerous move for any government in riot-prone South Asia. And, even more obviously, a jihadist insurgency is raging inside the country, threatening the very core of the Pakistani state and putting serious strain on the United States’ already tenuous alliance with Pakistan. With the Pakistani military and ISI heavily preoccupied with these issues, it is little wonder that the link between the Pakistani state and militant groups like the ones believed to have pulled off the Mumbai attacks has grown murkier, making it all the more difficult for India to readily assign blame to the Pakistani government for these attacks.

Next, we turn to India. The Indian government in 2001-2002 was led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has traditionally been more hard-line in its rhetoric and actions against Islamist militancy and Pakistan, especially in comparison to the now-ruling Congress party, which has long been accused of being “soft on terrorism.” Given the magnitude and sophistication of the Mumbai attacks, there are reasonably strong suspicions that a Pakistani link is involved — most likely rogue elements of the ISI and elements of al Qaeda in Pakistan that already had strong ties with many of the Islamist militant groups operating in India. Just as in the wake of the Parliament attack, the Mumbai attacks do not allow for Indian inaction. With the Indian economy hit hard, vulnerabilities of Indian security exposed and the entire world watching India’s next moves, New Delhi cannot tolerate an ineffectual Pakistani state that cannot clamp down on these militant connections. Whether it is the Congress government in place now or a successor BJP government, the Indians must act.

And, finally, we have the United States. In 2001-2002, the war against Islamist militants was still in its early stages. The U.S. military was conducting successful operations in Afghanistan and the Iraq war had not yet become an issue. After the 9/11 attacks, Washington was full of fury and ready to act and was able to prevent a nuclear catastrophe in large part because no one wanted to get in its way. While it was equally direct with New Delhi and Islamabad, Washington was able to use India to pressure the Pakistanis on the counterterrorism front.

Today, the United States is in political transition, revealing the strategic calculations behind the timing of this attack. With Washington in political limbo, it is unclear who can actually step forward to mediate the crisis this time around. The Bush administration is in no position to make promises for the next administration, and President-elect Barack Obama still has a good two months until he assumes power. Moreover, the United States has its plate full between the global financial crisis, consolidating gains in Iraq, keeping the Iranians at bay, figuring out how to fend off a resurgent Russia and, finally, dealing with a intensifying insurgency in the Pakistan/Afghanistan theater that will only be exacerbated by a crisis between India and Pakistan. In short, while the United States is never as powerless as it seems, it does have less room to maneuver in handling this crisis.

Added together, the domestic politics of India, Pakistan and the United States are leading up to an inevitable flare-up on the Indo-Pakistani border. In cases like this, the preferences of policy makers matter little. Each country is getting locked into place, and the logic appears to be pointing to a crisis.

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