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By Fred Burton
The new year is an ideal time, in geopolitics as in other areas of life, to reflect on developments of the past year and, at Stratfor, to offer our view of those we anticipate in the realm of terrorism in 2006.
For quite some time, we have been tracking al Qaeda's metamorphosis from a relatively small group of individuals who viewed themselves as the vanguard of radical Islamism -- calling themselves "Knights under the Prophet's Banner" -- to a much broader movement or ideology capable of influencing the behavior of many others. The rhetoric of Osama bin Laden and the other leaders of the jihadist cause has called clearly and repeatedly for the "Ummah," or Islamic people, to rise up and join the "jihad against the Jews and Crusaders." While this call has not resulted in the worldwide uprising al Qaeda's leaders hoped for, it has nonetheless resonated in some quarters.
From Group to Movement
This shift from a group to a movement was evident in 2005, and we believe there will be further signs of the evolution in 2006.
In the major attacks attributed to al Qaeda or close affiliates during 2005 -- such as those in London (July), Sharm el-Sheikh (July), Bali (October), and Amman (November) -- operatives from regional groups, rather than teams of what might be called the "al Qaeda all-stars" that carried out the Sept. 11 operation, took up the banner of jihad. The differences here are important: The Sept. 11 hijackers were dispatched from "The Base" and came to the United States to carry out their missions. They received direct logistical support and operational guidance from al Qaeda's central command structure. On the other hand, the operatives in London and Indonesia were locals, and the operatives in Amman were regional, in the sense that they crossed over the border from Iraq to carry out their strikes.
While there are connections between the main al Qaeda leadership and operational cells in places like Britain and Iraq -- as evident from the group's statements, intercepted letters and the suicide video of London bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan -- the language of the letter purportedly written by deputy al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq clearly demonstrates that the various nodes of al Qaeda exist in more of a loose federation than a strict hierarchical chain of command. In the letter, al-Zawahiri made flattering statements to al-Zarqawi and requested that he do certain things -- such as stop beheading hostages and ease his attacks against the Shia -- but he was not clearly ordering him to do those things. And indeed, al-Zarqawi's militants continued to carry out attacks against Shiite targets in Iraq even after the letter was made public.
Al Qaeda's tendency to work with local militants has been well established since the early 1990s: It showed up in operations targeting places like Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia and New York. This system was institutionalized in 1998, when bin Laden issued a joint fatwa with the Egyptian Islamic Group, Al Jihad, the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh and the "Jamaat ul Ulema e Pakistan" under the name "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders." The fatwa declares it the "individual duty for every Muslim" to attack "Jews and Crusaders" wherever possible, "in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam."
Al Qaeda gained momentum and strength after bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996. This enabled the group to operate without the assistance of local militants. However, after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the arrests or deaths of several key al Qaeda leaders and the seizure of millions of dollars in assets, al Qaeda has reverted back to its earlier operational model.
As we have noted previously, this shift gives "al Qaeda the movement" broader geographic and operational reach than "al Qaeda the group", but at the same time it is shallower in a sense: The new actor lacks the operational depth and expertise of the core group and its well-trained leadership. In fact, al Qaeda the group has been unable to demonstrate a continued capability to act as a strategic force -- meaning one whose actions can drastically reshape the world -- since the Sept. 11 attacks. There have been no strikes carried out by "all-star teams" since Sept. 11. Instead, the operations that have taken place have borne much stronger resemblances to the anti-U.S. attacks in the 1990s, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing or the embassy bombings in East Africa. Such actions can kill many people and are not to be lightly dismissed -- but in terms of geopolitical impact and magnitude, they are mere pinpricks when compared to the stunning blow that was dealt on Sept. 11.
Thwarted Attacks, Timing and Resilience
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